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SECURE REAL-TIME SMART GRID COMMUNICATIONS:
A MICROGRID PERSPECTIVE
Velin Kounev, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2015
Microgrids are a key component in the evolution of the power grid. Microgrids are required
to operate in both grid connected and standalone island mode using local sources of power.
A major challenge in implementing microgrids is the communications and control to support
transition from grid connected mode and operation in island mode. In this dissertation we
propose a distributed control architecture to govern the operation of a microgrid. The func-
tional communication requirements of primary, secondary and tertiary microgrid controls are
considered. Communication technology media and protocols are laid out and a worst-case
availability and latency analysis is provided. Cyber Security challenges to microgrids are ex-
amined and we propose a secure communication architecture to support microgrid operation
and control. A security model, including network, data, and attack models, is defined and
a security protocol to address the real-time communication needs of microgrids is proposed.
We propose a novel security protocol that is custom tailored to meet those challenges. The
chosen solution is discussed in the context of other security options available in the liter-
ature. We build and develop a microgrid co-simulation model of both the power system
and communication networks, that is used to simulate the two fundamental microgrid power
transition functions - transition from island to grid connected mode, and grid connected to
island mode. The proposed distributed control and security architectures are analyzed in
terms of performance. We further characterize the response of the power and communication
subsystems in emergency situations: forced islanding and forced grid modes. Based on our
findings, we generalize the results to the smart grid.
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The U.S. electric grid is an independently owned, complex network of power plants and
transmission lines. By and large, the grid constitutes wires, substations, transformers and
switches. The existing infrastructure is unidirectional in nature - power is carried from the
plants where it is generated to the end-consumers, where it is consumed. The geograph-
ical distance between generation and consumption is often large. This leads to practical
inefficiencies. Only a third of the originating fuel is converted to electricity. Close to 10%
is lost during transmission, and another 20% is held in reserve - only to be use in case of
emergencies, or 5% of the time [8]. Due to it’s ad-hoc construction the grid is prone to
cascading failures resulting in wide-area blackouts. All electrical transmission has to operate
on the same frequency at all times, and supply and demand between power plants and end-
customers, has to be balanced in real-time. Deviations in operating frequencies and unequal
balance are the primary technical reasons for domino effect failures.
The next generation electric grid, commonly referred to as "smart grid", is expected to
address issues of inefficiency and reliability. This would be made possible by the introduction
of two main improvements: distributed power generation and power flow control systems.
Distributed generation means that power is generated closer to where it is needed. This
approach elevates the need for transporting electricity over large distances, eliminating issues
of in-transit power loss. Since local supply would be custom tailored to local demand,
different areas of the grid would have to be segregated. This would ensure that multiple
areas of supply and demand do not interfere with each other. By only controlling local
frequency and power balance, wide-spread blackout would be less prominent. Protection
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would ensure that the domino effect is interrupted - failure in one grid would be locally
contained, and a local grid would be able protect itself by disconnecting from the main.
Additionally, a local grid would be able to supply power to nearby failed grids. In the
literature this small smart grid is commonly referred to as a microgrid.
A power network of microgrids is immensely complex. The current generation of power
flow control system has to be re-thought. The Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition,
or SCADA, was introduced after the large blackout of 1965 [9]. Initially rolled out in critical
sub-stations in order to help visualize the state of the grid, today, SCADA has a large pen-
etration in the transmission network. Still, the system was build to support uni-directional
power flow, and post-failure manual power restoration. Foremost, SCADA is a information
gathering system, and not an automated control and protection agent. For smart grid level
of pervasive control and monitoring, the new control system would have to integrate infor-
mation technology, communication technology and power system engineering. Distributed
generation would mean that bi-directional power flow and automated protection would re-
quire on-the-fly autonomous actions from the control system without human supervision.
The vision of this modern grid is grand. The dilemma most utilities face, however, is
how to get to the future as soon as possible, while minimizing cost and not taking any
risks. Utilities still see their primary concern as keeping the lights on, and investments into
unproven technology is viewed as unsound business. The cost of this grid of microgrids
is staggering compared to a single uni-directional infrastructure and there is a lack of a
business model for return on the investment. Customers are mostly unaware or uninterested
in smart grids - electricity is a commodity, and the only sales pitch is how cheap it can be
sold and how quickly power can be restored after failure. Microgrids are not a product, but
a solution to supply challenges that the current grid is not capable of meeting. One can
theorize that the smart grid would not emerge within the business community, but instead
from an organization with specific and particular power needs.
One such customer is the U.S.A. Military and the Department of Defense. A military base
is similar to a city, with houses, shopping centers and entertainment venues. Power to such
installation is brought by a number of feeder lines, representing a security risk. Interruption
of power jeopardizes the security of the base. A microgrid can continue supplying power to
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the area even in the absence of the main feed, absorbing and dampening any disturbance due
to service interruption. Another potential application for microgrids are business operations
located in remote or underdeveloped regions such as offshore oil drilling rigs, or data centers
in third world countries.
Today, smart grid and microgrid are still simply concepts. They aim to meet specific
needs, yet currently they are loosely defined due to our lack of clear understanding of what
they are. The evolution into the grid of the future could start with an intermediate hybrid
distribution network (Figure 1). The current grid would be at the core of this network, its
simply too vast to be replaced. Equipment modernization would take place from within
(substation automation, phasor measuring units and so forth). Edge connected microgrids
would provide custom solutions to high demand customers, such as the US military. A
natural evolution would then take place until the technical difference between the main grid
and edge microgrids would dissolve. A smart grid would be finally realized.
Figure 1: Network topology of intermediate hybrid distribution network.
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1.2 CONTRIBUTION
This dissertation attempts to address the following question:
Can the current state-of-the-art telecommunication and security protocols provide the
highly available secure communication required for real-time microgrid operations?
Key background concepts include microgrid operations, distributed control systems, net-
work reliability and availability, network performance and cyber security. In this context,
this dissertation makes the following contributions:
• We propose a distributed control architecture to govern the operation of a microgrid.
The functional requirements of primary, secondary and tertiary microgrid controls are
considered. Communication technology media and protocols are laid out and a worst-case
availability and latency analysis is provided.
• Cyber Security challenges to microgrids are examined. We propose a novel security
protocol that is custom tailored to meet those challenges. The chosen solution is discussed
in the context of other security options available in the literature. Our approach is
justified by comparing performance and scalability characteristics.
• Microgrids operate in two modes: grid connected, in which there is two-way power ex-
change between the microgrid and the main power grid (or possibly another microgrid),
and island mode, in which the microgrid does not feed or draw power from its surround-
ings. We build and develop a microgrid model, that simulates the two fundamental
microgrid power transition functions - transition from island to grid connected mode,
and grid connected to island mode. The proposed distributed control and security archi-
tectures are analyzed in terms of performance. We further characterize the response of
the power and communication subsystems in emergency situation - forced islanding and
forced grid modes.
• Based on our findings, we generalize the results to the smart grid. Prevailing smart grid
communication architectures and security standards are examined and discussed. We
propose enhancements to those and justify our recommendations.
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1.3 DISSERTATION OVERVIEW
This dissertation is organized as follows: we continue with a review of the related literature,
each chapter of this work building upon the one preceding. Figure 2 lists the chapter layout
and the background topics to be reviewed. Completed chapter are highlighted and future
work is indicated with a dashed border.
Chapters I and II provide the Introduction, Motivation and Literature review of related
background theory and concepts.
Chapter III presents a communication network and distributed control system architec-
tures to provide signaling for the microgrid operations introduced in [10]. The different
communication options are discussed and their performance in the context is characterized.
Initial discussion regarding the embedded secondary and tertiary controllers is presented,
including an overview of potential performance bottlenecks. The chapter presents the paper
titled "Analysis of an Offshore Medium Voltage DC Microgrid Environment âĂŞ Part II:
Communication Network Architecture" and presented at IEEE T&D PES 2014. I am the
primary author of the paper and was written under the guidance of Dr. David Tipper. The
paper is based on the work presented by Dr. Grainger et al. [11].
Chapter IV addresses the question of communication security of the distributed control
architecture presented in the previous section. Security adds considerable performance strain
to the system and limits some aspects of the communication flow. For that reason and the
fact that microgrids and smart grids are critical infrastructure, the discussion of security
protocol was important enough to be a separate topic by itself. We provide a solution
that differs from the most research concepts found in the literature today. Our security
protocol is discussed and compared to justify the decision. The chapter presents the paper
"A Secure Communication Architecture for Distributed Microgrid Control" accepted in IEEE
Transaction on Smart Grid 2015, special issue on âĂĲCyber Physical Systems and Security
for Smart GridâĂİ. I am the primary author of the paper and was written under the guidance
of Dr. David Tipper. Dr. Yavuz provided the expertise on encryption algorithms specifics
5
Figure 2: Thesis overview and related background topics.
and specifications. The paper is based on the work presented by Dr. Grainger et al. [11].
Chapter V aims to provide quantitative performance results of the solutions provided thus far
in this dissertation. Microgrids still are in a research stage and real-world implementations
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do not yet exist outside of a few small testbeds. The only possible approach is to build a
simulation environment, while keeping in mind that it is only a simulation and as such it is
an approximation. Co-simulation environment will be developed while taking advantage of
some existing packages and creating new software where none is available. The co-simulator
would incorporate the power and communication networks in one package. Each end-device
would have to simulate simultaneous interaction with both environments and account for
any possible cross influence between the networks. The test case scenarios would include
normal microgrid transition modes, as well as emergency connect and disconnect events.
The chapter presents the paper "A Microgrid Co-Simulation Framework" and presented at
IEEE Cyber-Physical Week 2015. I am the primary author of the paper and was written
under the guidance of Dr. David Tipper. Furthermore, I developed the co-simulator and
the synchronization algorithm described in the paper. Dr. Martin Lévesque provided his
expertise in the field of smart grid co-simulation and co-authored the paper. The paper is
based on the work presented by Dr. Grainger et al. [11].
Chapter VI generalizes the finds from the previous chapters by the effect of communica-
tion and distributed system delays on the microgrid power control and stability. The paper
is co-authored by myself and Dr. Grainger with an equal contribution.
Our conclusion and future work is discussed in Chapter VII.
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2.0 RELATED LITERATURE
Smart grid and microgrid have different origins. Smart grid has its roots in government
and business, and it is the umbrella term encompassing all possible modernization of the
US power grid [12–15]. From improvement in automatic operations to real-time pricing for
customers, the smart grid would enable a new business model for the power utility sector.
In contrast, microgrid is a technical term put forth by the scientific community [16, 17]. It
is a technical solution to the challenges facing today’s aging power distribution network.
Microgrid’s definition is concrete and precise. It is, however, not possible without one en-
abling technology, telecommunications. The power community focuses on the improvements
of power control algorithms, resulting in that most microgrid peer-review publications ignore
the effects of the communication networks. Proposed concepts assume that control messages
between distributed controllers flow securely and instantly, ignoring all questions of packet
errors, network congestion and transmission delays and delay jitter. There publication ne-
glect any performance degradations of the power flow due to the communication network’s
conduct. In contrast, the efforts of the computer, information science and telecommunica-
tion communities are directed at how to apply existing computation algorithms, protocols
and concepts to power networks in the context of smart grid. Most publications from these
groups marginalize power flow characteristics. As the NIST roadmap to smart grid [18]
notes:
"When practices from one sector, such as the IT or communications sector, are applied
directly to the power sector, care must be taken because such practices may degrade reliabil-
ity and increase risk. This is because the requirements for the power sector, for timing of
communications, for example, may be different from the IT and communications sectors."
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The two communities lack a common language and terminologies. For solutions to have
merit outside of pure scientific debate, it is important to have input from both sides. This
work attempts to address this by providing communication network solutions to practical
power flow problems that can be used in real-world applications. We choose microgrid
operations for this investigation. The high level of maturity of microgrid theory governs this
decision. The rest of this literature review aims to introduce all background concepts. We
start by theoretically defining smart grid and microgrid, followed by an explanation of the
relationship between the two. The discussion concludes with an overview of real-time and
secure communication principles and practices.
2.1 SMART GRID DEFINITION
The smart grid emerged from the efforts of the US Government as the vision for the nation’s
future electrical network. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in collaboration with the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), sets forth six key functionalities to be achieved by smart grid infrastruc-
ture: (1) Advanced Metering Infrastructure; (2) Demand Response; (3) Electric Vehicles;
(4) Wide-area Situation Awareness; (5) Distributed Energy Resources and Storage; and, (6)
Distributed Grid Management [19].
Each set of functions has its own requirements in terms of bandwidth, latency and
availability for the communication systems. The communication infrastructure is divided
into 3 parts: Home Area Network, Neighborhood Area Network and Wide Area Network.
Summaries for each smart grid functionality is presented below.
• Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI): The primary connection between the customer
and utilities provider. The function of the system is to collect and measure energy
consumption for billing and statistical purposes. Future AMI evolutions are envisioned to
allow automation modulation of energy loads during peak hours. This advanced two-way
communication would require significant investment due to near real-time operational
requirements. Operational requirements such as bandwidth, availability and latency are
9
expected to grow to significantly higher level.
• Demand Response (DR): One of the most significant advantages of smart grid is demand
response (DR) functionality. Demand response is the reduction of the consumption of
electric energy by customers due to increase of energy pricing or heavy burden on the
system. Such operation can significantly reduce peak loads. The final most advance
version of DR is automated DR, allowing on-premise smart appliances to respond to
dynamic condition on the grid, and shift load consumption in a near-real-time manner.
• Wide Area Situational Awareness (WASA): A set of technologies designed to improve
the monitoring of the power system across large geographical areas. Because of the
inherently interconnected and interdependent nature of the grid operation, a disturbance
in the power supply in one area can quickly spread and become a widespread problem,
âĂĲwith cascading and deleterious consequencesâĂİ
• Distributed Energy Resources and Storage (DER): One of the main advantages of smart
grid is more robust support for distributed energy resources into the grid. The energy
flow will be multi-directional, from utility to home, home to utility, or even from home
to home. For successful operation, real-time net metering is required in order to measure
the electricity drawn from the grid minus the energy provided by energy sources on
the premises. Finally, DER is suppose to provide more robust model for incorporating
renewable energy sources into the grid.
• Electric Vehicles (EV): Mass-marketing of Electric Vehicles promises great reduction in
emissions and energy independence. The current electrical grid is unlikely to provide the
peak capacity required to charge a significant number of EV during peak hours. Further,
EVs present a new opportunity as electric storage devices, that can balance load demands
across the grid.
• Distribution Automation (DA): Would allow utilities to remotely monitor and control
equipment in its distribution network through automated decision-making, providing
more effective fault detection and power restoration. The primary function of DA is to
reduce voltage to an appropriate level in order to isolate potential faults, and to ensure
adverse effect do not spread to other portions of the grid.
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2.2 MICROGRID DEFINITION
Microgrids have been proposed as a better way to implement the emerging potential of re-
newable energy generation [20]. The required building blocks of microgrids are the presence
of an energy source, loads and back-up energy supply (traditionally energy storage or diesel
generators). The fundamental operational requirements for microgrids are operation in is-
land mode, requiring frequency and voltage stability for optimal power flow, grid connected
to island mode, ensuring transition and stabilization for minimal load shedding and dis-
ruption, and island to grid connected mode transition, resulting in re-synchronization and
minimum impact for sensitive loads during transient periods. From a control point of view,
the microgrids can be summarized by three layers: primary, secondary and tertiary control.
Each one of those layers is a separate physical entity, that may or may not be owned by the
same operator.
Droop control for optimal power flow is the prevailing microgrid operation [21–24]. The
primary controller(s) within the microgrid senses changes in the power network’s frequency
and adjusts the power output. No communication network signaling is present. The addition
of a power source or removal of a load would be detected via changing power characteristics
without the need for communication between controllers. Once the controller detects a
change in the operating frequency, it adjusts the generator to produce more power in the
event of a load addition, or less power in the event of a load removal. Droop control is a
basic operation needed for the microgrid power balance and power flow operation.
Such concepts are not new to the power transportation community [9]. For decades,
utilities have employed similar algorithms in substation automation. In the event of power
line removal from the network, the bus downstream would be the first power equipment
that detects voltage decline. The bus taps its transformer in order to restore distribution
voltage to its target levels. If the transmission voltage decays under target minimum, the
operator may insert additional capacitor banks. This would raise the voltage back to nominal
levels requiring the transformer to tap back down as to avoid over-voltage at the bus. Each
tap is mechanical operation and the opening and closing results in wear to the equipment.
Furthermore, the detect-and-then-act mode of operation of the power network introduces
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transient periods of power instability that can last tens of seconds.
The main idea behind the coupling of power and communication systems is that such
unnecessary mechanical operations can be avoided. In the example above, the operator
could select a sequence of events to take place, ensuring the additional voltage source is
online prior to tripping of the power line. This would result in shortening the transient
period and extending the life of the power equipment.
2.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SMART GRID AND MICROGRID
Figure 3: Building blocks of smart grid, and the relationship to microgrid. DOE’s definition
of smart grid functionality is indicated on both sides of the pyramid.
The smart grid definitions put forth by the Department of Energy are high-level appli-
cational requirements. To be realized, a number of enabling technologies and intermediate
steps must take place. Figure 3 depicts smart grid’s architecture at a high level going from
bottom to top [8]. At the bottom, the IT infrastructure, the secure real-time signaling
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network and the circuit infrastructure would lay on top of the physical power plants and
transmission lines. These two bottom layers are the foundations for all future applications.
Each new layer that builds upon the previous one is more complex, requiring a higher level of
performance and interoperability. The horizontal integration at each level is the basic build-
ing blocks of smart grid; nevertheless, functionality is only possible when the vertical blocks
start working together. Smart meters and the data collected from them would make use
of the IT infrastructure. Once in place, the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) would
enable utilities and customers to have near-real time pricing and service updates. At each
customer premise, the home area network (HAN) would allow for the connection of customer
electronics and electric vehicles (EV) to smart meters. Furthermore, HAN would allow for
remote control of power electronics, eventually leading to demand response (DR). This is
the most significant improvement envisioned in smart grid, enabling real-time load shedding
control by the utilities. As such DR is among the most technically complex portions of smart
grid. If DR is to be possible, utilities would have to invest in modernization of the core dis-
tribution network. The modernization would start in the distribution substations, giving
operators up-to-date wide area situational awareness (WASA). Once substations not only
provide monitoring data, but take automatic preventative actions, distribution automation
(DA) would be possible. The distribution management system would be centrally control-
ling the two-way flow of electricity in the transportation network. The ability to balance
two-way power flow would enable energy storage and distributed generation, or DER. These
two items are fundamental features of microgrids and would have to be implemented in the
core network before a microgrid could be connected. Until then, microgrids would have to
operate in island mode or be used only for a backup in case of the main line failures (U.S.A.
military application of choice). Finally, volt-var optimization would be possible since each
bus in the network would provide real-time statistics, enabling the reduction of safety buffers
and optimizing power flow.
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2.4 REAL-TIME COMMUNICATION FOR POWER NETWORKS
A communication system would provide the fast, secure and reliable means for microgrids
to operate and coexist. During normal operations, signaling would allow microgrids to
synchronize with the main prior to connecting, extending equipment lifetime and minimizing
transient periods in the electrical network. In emergencies, signaling would ensure that the
power exchange would be disengaged prior to power equipment’s detection of abnormal levels
of voltage or frequency, thereby avoiding any potential damage.
In order to achieve those goals, the three main requirements of the communication net-
work are: real-time performance guarantees, evaluated via worst case delay performance
analysis; unquestionable security, providing tempering and confidentiality guarantees while
respecting the real-time boundaries; and extremely high availability, needed to ensure the
non-interrupted service. These are challenging due to the simple fact that both power and
communication subsystems are electrical networks. The first, the power, is an analog electri-
cal system, while the second, the communication, is a digital electrical system. Even in the
presence of fibre-optic communication links, most of the delay in the communication network
would be introduced by the embedded control sub-systems that govern the flow of control
messages and the execution of control logic. These systems are digital electrical machines,
and as such the challenge can be summarized as electricity chasing electricity.
To illustrate, let us consider the following sequence of events. After the detection of
an emergency event in the power network, the protection equipment would send notifica-
tion messages to neighboring equipment via the communication system, in order to prevent
domino effect failures. However, these messages would only be relevant if they arrived prior
to the arrival of any harmonics in the electrical network - digital electrical packets would
be racing against transient analog voltage. Additionally, messages to protection equipment
located further than one-hop away, would have to be processed by intermediate network
devices. Such devices add nominal processing delay, due to the execution of internal rout-
ing protocols. Buffering delay would be added in case of network congestion, which in this
example is very likely. All other power equipment would be also signaling at the same time.
In a worst case scenario packet drops are possible if intermediate routing nodes reach their
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internal buffer limits and they need to free up memory space. Communication packets car-
rying warning signals may not arrive at the destination prior to the power line’s disturbance
arrival. In such a scenario, the network packets are no longer of any use since the local pro-
tection equipment would have to take independent protective action. As a result of its own
tripping, the machine would send additional warning messages, creating even more traffic in
the already congested communication network. The problem would increase with each addi-
tional protection tripping. For a microgrid communication protocol to be a viable practical
option, it must ensure that such scenarios would be handled properly.
Figure 4: Power vs. Telecommunication subsystems timescale [3].
Figure 26 summarizes the different time-scales in the power and communication networks.
The time unit of control signals traveling the telecommunication network is in milliseconds.
Electrical phenomenon in the power network mostly last under tens of milliseconds. End-
to-end packet delay would be close to the upper-time boundary of the power transient,
meaning that any electrical power phenomenon would be hard to prevent from spreading
via telecommunication signaling. The critical nature of operations further complicates the
problem, by adding additional processing delay due to data encryption at each end point.
Furthermore, most of the messages are broadcast/multicast in nature, resulting in multiple
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packets for a single event notification. Reliability analysis of any communication protocol
would have to include the proper delivery of all broadcast/multicast messages.
The power utilities have faced the problem of telecommunication enabled power distri-
bution for decades. The major challenge faced by the substation automation system (SAS)
is to provide interoperability between protection, control and monitoring services. In or-
der to address this issue, in 2003, the international electro-technical commission published
"Communication Networks and System in Substation" [25]. Today, the widely accepted IEC
61850 provides standards for telecommunication data exchange, data format definition (all
the way up to level 7 of the OSI model), and XML based configuration. The main goal of
the standard is to take away any ambiguity regarding the functionality of a subsystem, or
Intelligent Electric Devices (IED). This document predefines all allowed power and network
equipment, their functionality, their inputs and outputs, and all interfaces to be carried over
the communication network. IEC 61850 uses a mixture of existing protocols in cases where
those meet the stringent performance requirements, and define new customized ones where
none exist, or performance is unsatisfactory.
The scientific community and industry has widely adopted a wide variety of protocols
from organization such as IETF and IEEE [26–28]. By design principle, these clearly separate
the communication network and the independent end-devices. In contrast, IEC 61850 views
the power and communication networks, and all attached end-devices, as a holistic system
designed for a specific task [25].
The IEC 61850 protocol’s end-device model connects to the network via an unique net-
work address. Within that physical device, there are one or more logical devices. Each logical
device contains one or more logical nodes. A logical node contains named grouping of data,
objects, and the implementation of the logic associated with particular power system func-
tion. In computer science terms, a logical node can be as simple as a single function or a class
and the logical device can be viewed as a library of classes. IEC 61850 pre-defines all aspects
from a single data field to a complete physical device. No new end-devices, functionaries,
communication inputs and outputs, or modifications are possible. This is the only way to
ensure that the performance specification are met. The protocol is a clear representation of
the power system engineering design practices.
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Figure 5: Substation network as per IEC61850 [4].
In the IEC 61850 protocol, the different logical devices communicate via publish and
subscribe mechanisms. The protocol views the entire communication network as a single
logical bus. Owners of data push updates "on the bus" and intermediate network devices
route data to destinations, multiplexing any broadcast messages. For instance, a sample
device configuration [4] may consist of two protective relays P1 and P2, and four switch
gear S1, S2, S3 and S4 (Figure 5). Each relay maintains and publishes two data objects Op
and Tr, indicating a TRIP command after fault detection. Additionally, P1 and P2 provide
status updates onto the bus via two additional data objects {St11,St12} and {St21,St22}.
S1 and S2 subscribe and monitor {Op1,Tr1}, S3 and S4 monitor {Op2,Tr2} for incoming
TRIP commands. For redundancy purposes, S1 and S3 need to monitor the status of P1 via
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Table 1: Timing requirements of end-to-end message deliveries in IEC 61850 [1].
Message Type IEC61850 Protocol Substation Interior Substation Exterior
Protection GSSE & GOOSE 3ms 8-12ms
Monitoring & Control TimeSync & ACSI 16ms 1s
Maintenance ACSI 1s 10s
Data Sampling SMV 3ms 10ms
{St11,St12} data object, and S2 and S4 do the same for P2 via {St21,St22}.
To meet the stringent power distribution delay requirements, IEC 61850 defines that
interlocking TRIP messages and data sampling messages must be delivered to the destination
within 3ms. The message delivery delay is the elapsed time from the instant the logical node
in the detecting IED (relay in the example above) generates the message to delivery in
the logical node of the protection IED (switches). Table 1 provides a summary of time
requirements of IEC 61850. It is important to note that most messages are multicast, they
have to be delivered to multiple IEDs, and the timing requirements apply to all subscribers.
Standard communication protocols were not designed to meet such delay constraints.
For this reason, the IEC 61850 specifies new network protocols. For all sampled data,
the protocol defines sample measured value (SMV) protocol (data objects {St11,St12} and
{St21,St22} for example). Generic object oriented substation events (GOOSE) delivers all
control commands, such as a TRIP command (data objects Op and Tr). A simple non-object
oriented counterpart to GOOSE is generic sample measured state event (GSSE). The final
two protocols are TimeSync for time synchronization and Abstract communication service
interface (ACSI) for data queries and acquisition. Figure 6 presents the full IEC 61850
protocol stack.
In summary, IEC 61850 takes a drastically different approach to telecommunication. All
end-devices and the communication network are not independent. The network would only
carry specific data, and would only communicate to pre-defined devices. This is the way to
ensure that the low latency and high availability requirements posed by the power network
operations are met. Furthermore, the document establishes a standard for interoperability
18
between vendors, with predefined configuration and support for IED types. However, the
main source of criticism of the standard is the complete omission of cyber security and the
assumption of a single communication network. Such assumptions are valid in sub-station
automation, however, microgrid operation would require communications between different
substation communication networks. IEC 61850 is insufficient to meet those challenges and
a new protocol definition is needed.
Figure 6: IEC61850 protocol stack. [1].
2.5 SECURE REAL-TIME COMMUNICATION FOR POWER
NETWORKS
Microgrids have not yet received much attention outside the power distribution scientific
community, resulting in the lack of microgrid related security communication research. The
literature on smart grid, however, has identified a number of candidates to meet the security
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needs of this new distribution system. Most of current publications mk are focusing on
customer based non-critical application security [29–33]. An example of these applications
is Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), which is to provide customer with up-to-date
energy consumption feedback. The primary concerns are customer privacy and the security
of non-critical energy consumption feedback data.
The most noteworthy document addressing information security for time critical smart
grid communication is IEC 62351 [34]. Released to build on top of IEC 61850, it attempts
to address the shortcomings in terms of cyber security for substation automation commu-
nication. The document discusses data authentication via digital signatures, access control,
security measures to prevent eavesdropping, prevention of playback and spoofing and intru-
sion detection. IEC 62351 specifies a variant of RSA as the de-facto standard in substation
automation communication. According to the specification, the sender hashes the time-
critical message using SHA256 and then encrypts the hash with a private key via RSA in
order to generate signature. The receiver hashes the message once again, decrypts the signed
hash with the sender’s public key, compares the received hash with the locally created one,
and if the two hashed values match, it accepts the message as valid.
The standard further specifies the conditions under which the protocols need to operate,
as a processing power and memory limited equipment as well as narrowband communication
channels. Defined is the threat model as disgruntled employees, industrial espionage, hack-
ers, vandalism and terrorism. In order to address those threats in the specified environment,
the document makes a number of suggestion. The aim is to secure the protocols already
defined in IEC 61850. The authors payed special attention to the real-time data transmis-
sion suite - GOOSE and SMV that require response time of 3 ms. The solution provided,
however, is very dubious. Sections of the documents seem to contradict each-other as to
how to provide cyber security to those critical data transmissions. Originally, the authors
suggest that since GOOSE and SMV communicate only on LAN, physical security and no
data encryption, should be employed as to avoid any encumbrance to the already resource
strained equipment. As a result, the standard instructs the device manufacturers to omit
any implementation of data confidentiality, while data integrity should be still provided.
Data confidentiality, via symmetric key cryptography is very efficient and given the small
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data quantities it results in no noticeable performance degradation. On the other hand,
the standard specifies RSA variant to be use for digital signatures. The algorithm based
on public key cryptography is much more computation intensive then symmetric key coun-
terparts, and current implementations cannot meet the stringent real-time delay delivery
requirements [35].
Even further, it would appear that the authors of the standard became aware during the
time of writing that the use of RSA signatures may take considerable time. As such, they
made a rather strange suggestion that all end-devices should keep track of the current time,
and any message received after 2 minutes of the transmission timestamp should be discarded.
This suggestion is in direct contradiction with the timing requirements put forth in IEC 61850
(Table 1). Such requirement further complicates the security challenge by mandating devices
to use current local times as security deterrent. In communication networks, synchronization
of the drifting prone independent local clocks is notoriously difficult problem to solve. For
that reason, most modern security protocol do not require synchronized clocks between the
sender and the receiver. This is even more true regarding the problem at hand since power
distribution operates on the millisecond timescale rather than seconds as in telecom networks.
More recently, a number of peer-review publications [35–40] have focused on time-
constrained secure communication for the smart grid. There are three major branches of
those: RSA based approaches, similar in approach to IEC 62351; message authentication
code schemes (MAC), leveraging symmetric security; and one-time signature (OTS) proto-
cols, making use of hash functions.
Message authentication code based protocols leverage a common symmetric key between
a sender and receiver pair. There are two common protocols in the literature. First, there is
Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [35]. The TESLA protocol
divides time into separate periods. The sender uses different keys to sign the messages in
each epoch. Once the key has expired, the sender releases the key in public, thus allowing the
receivers to verify any buffered messages. Further, once the key is public, the sender loses all
it privacy leverage and needs to move on to the next key. The advantage of these protocols
is the one-to-many, or multicast, characteristic allowing a single message to be verified by
multiple recipients. However, the buffering requirements make this protocol unsuitable for
21
real-time communication.
The second MAC based variant uses the incomplete-set-scheme principle. For every
receiver, the transmitter has a separate short key. The sender signs a single message with all
the private keys of all the recipients. To verify a message, each receiver uses a private key
to create a local MAC and compares it to the received MAC. Since only the message sender
has the full set of private keys, no other member of the communication cluster can fabricate
the identity. This protocol suffers from communication overhead, for n receivers we need n
MACs in each message. However, it provides excellent computational performance due to
its use of symmetric cryptography as opposed to the public key counterparts.
In the last decade, new authentication based schemes have received much attention.
Originally designed for sensor networks, which are resource constrained, those protocols
leverage the speed of one way hash functions without a trapdoor. A number of One-Time
Signature (OTS) schemes have been proposed [36,37]. At the core, they all thrive to address
the two main shortcoming of the approach - it’s "one-timed-ness" and the large public key
size.
Wang et al [41] have proposed TV-HORS, one of the most cited security protocols in the
context of the smart grid. TV-HORS uses pre-computed hash chains to authenticate data.
Since a sender cannot know in advance what data would be sent and specific hash chains
cannot pre-computed, the protocol creates a mapping of what data parts maps to a what
hash value. The sender divides the time into epochs. In each epoch, there are an active public
and private keys. Once the private key has been used to the point of jeopardizing security,
it is released to the public, and the epoch is advanced by one. The defunct private key
becomes the public key for the new epoch. Every message is cut into predefined size chunks.
More chunks per message result in higher security, but shorten the length of the epoch. Each
message chunk maps to generic pre-computed hash value from the private key and the final
hash vector becomes the signature for the data. The receiver cuts the message again and
hashes the chunks locally. If the received hash vector matches the locally computed one,
then the end-device accepts the message. Since each received hash vector can be mapped to
old public key, the receiver can verify that the received hash vector has not been replaced
in transit. The limitation of the protocol is the quite large public key, compared to MAC
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based protocols, and the short epoch duration in the cases of a large number of messages
per second. There are a number of variants [42, 43, 43], with some of them extending the
length of epochs, but the basic approach is the same and none has gained more publicity
then TV-HORS.
In [1], Xiang Lu el al. simulated IEC 61850 while varying the CPU speed of the sender and
receiver. Their results confirmed that most of the security protocols have poor performance,
under 40% delivery rate (Table 2), when the CPU speed is below 600 MHz. Today, such
600 MHz is the standard CPU speed for equipment for power distribution networks on sale
by Eaton Corporation [44] and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories [45]. For comparison,
the Department of Energy has mandated that most message that would be exchanged in
the communication network employed in the core of the power distribution network would
have to guarantee reliability above 99.999% [46]. Reliability in the context of the smart grid
should be understood as a variant of performability [47]. Messages should be delivered error
free within the specified time limit above the required availability threshold.
Table 2: Delivery ratio of GOOSE and SMV messages within the 3ms substation interior
limit, while considering different signature schemes and based on the sender and receiver’s
CPU clock speeds [1].
CPU Frequency
Algorithm 600 MHz 1 GHz 1.6 GHz
No Encryption 97% 98% 99%
RSA 36% 63% 85%
MAC 87% 98% 98%
HORS 90% 98% 95%
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2.6 CONCLUSION
The chapter reviews literature publication regarding power operations and communication
networks in the context of smart grid and microgrid. The review started by defining the
two terms and defining the relationship between the two. Both concepts pose real-time and
high-security requirements to the communication network. The chapter reviews aÂănumber
of real-time protocols and options presented in the literature, followed by an overview of
the security extension. Furthermore, the review discussed areas of omissions and drawback
in the presented solutions that would be the main focus of the thesis. The next chapter
proposes a communication architecture for a DC based microgrid.
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3.0 MICROGRID COMMUNICATION NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
Microgrids have been proposed as a better way to implement the emerging potential of re-
newable energy generation. The required building blocks of microgrids are the presence of
an energy source, loads and back-up energy supply (traditionally energy storage or diesel
generators). The fundamental operational requirements for microgrids are operation in is-
landing mode, requiring frequency and voltage stability for optimal power flow, grid to
islanding mode, ensuring transition and stabilization for minimal load shedding and distri-
bution, and islanding to grid mode, resulting in re-synchronization and minimum impact for
sensitive loads during transient periods. Each of those operations are substantially complex
and require the harmonic operation of the number of different sub-systems. The electri-
cal distribution system needs to work in tight synchronization with the signaling system.
Fast co-operation of those systems is dependent upon scalable and intelligently designed co-
existence architectures. From a control point of view, the microgrids can be summarized by
three layers: primary, secondary and tertiary control. Each one of those layers is a separate
physical entity, that may or may not be owned by the same operator. Each control layer must
function in unison with each other in a scalable and highly efficient manner. Designing a
communication network architecture to meet the stringent real-time operation requirements
of the control layers is the focus of this article. As a potential application for a microgrid
scenario we focus on offshore drilling platforms supplied by wind farm power generation.
Today, domestic offshore oil drilling takes place in the Gulf of Mexico and Northern Alaska.
The eastern seaboards, from North Carolina through Maine, are locations with the greatest
potential for offshore oil and gas drilling [48].
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Figure 7: Local Offshore Wind Power Supplying Power to Offshore Oil Drilling Platform.
Drilling rigs and offshore oil platforms rely heavily on AC variable frequency drives for
applications such as propulsion, station keeping, drilling, and pumping product to the sur-
face. Supplying consistent and reliable power to those installations is a mandate with regards
to system economics. Due to the ever increasing complexity of the oil drilling procedures, re-
quiring newer techniques such as horizontal drilling at a greater depth, oil platforms require
additional electricity to power the drills and auxiliary platform operations [49]. Currently,
power is generated on site using diesel generators in a highly inefficient conversion process,
resulting in tens of millions of dollars in operation expenses per platform [50, 51]. Using
renewable energy, specifically wind generation at sea, is an appealing alternative. The po-
tential generation capabilities of offshore wind power is much greater since offshore wind
is stronger, less intermittent, and more consistent compared to traditional onshore wind
generation.
In Part I, we propose a microgrid control architecture for supplying wind-turbine gen-
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erated energy to the drilling platform. The architecture is distributed in nature (Figure
7). The correct operation of the power distribution network relies on reliable signaling pro-
vided by the telecommunication sub-system. The architectural details of the communication
system for the power system architecture in Figure 7 is the focus of this article.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II gives an overview of
distributed control architecture, including the microgrid and wide-area communication net-
works. Section III presents telecommunication technological options, as well as security and
addressing protocols for the proposed architecture. Finally, our conclusion is drawn in section
IV.
3.1 COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
Communication network architectures are described in terms of the seven layer OSI Model
[52]. For the purposes of the following discussion, the focus is on layers two and three -
Media Access Level (MAC) and Internet Protocol (IP). Simply put, the MAC layer provides
the functionality to send and receive data between a transmitter and a receiver, within
the bounds of the same network. Basic transmission error checking is provided. The IP
layer builds upon, adding intra-network addressing, substantially improved error checking,
re-transmission capabilities for lost packets, congestion control, and session management
(via Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP)). In-depth
discussion of the OSI Model and the above mentioned protocols is out of the scope of this
paper, with additional resources listed [53].
Due to the real-time, and safety critical nature of the drilling operation, the communi-
cation network has to provide above all fast, reliable and secure service. The entire commu-
nication network can be envisioned as two separate networks: (1) microgrid network and (2)
wide-area communication network. The microgrid network includes the secondary control,
DC/DC converters, primary controllers, induction machines, and the diesel backup genera-
tor. For more details on the operation of the microgrid’s energy control architecture please
refer to Part I. The wide-area network, induces the tertiary control, wind turbine farm(s)
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and the secondary control, with the secondary control functioning as a bridge between the
two networks. The geographical distance between the elements of the wide area network can
be quite high, in the tens of miles, depending on how far away the wind farms are installed
from the offshore platform.
3.1.1 Microgrid Communication Network
The frequency of messages in the microgrid network is determined by the fastest cycle of
a sub-system element in the network. There are three logical channels in the network (1)
induction machine/primary controller to the secondary controller, (2) secondary controller
to the DC/DC converters, (3) secondary controller to backup generator (Figure 8). There
is no reverse logical channel between the secondary and primary controllers. The primary
controller functions as independent local control. The channel between the induction machine
and the secondary controller has the highest frequency of messages. The induction machine
would provide torque and rotor speed measurements every 10 to 25 µs [54]. This high
of a frequency is necessary in order to capture and address transient phenomenon due to
grid islanding. The two measurements provided are float values, and the payload of every
message is not extensive, however, the high update frequency means that the number of
messages every second would be considerable. Each measurement value pair, is unique to
the induction machine, and the number of measurements are proportional to the number
of induction machines in the microgrid. Given the update cycle, the estimated number
could be between 5,000 to 10,000 messages per induction machine per second. Once the
secondary controller receives the measured values from each induction machine, it calculates
the appropriate duty cycles for each of the two DC/DC converters, as to alter the demanded
power flow to the machine loads. Those values are emitted with the same frequency of
around 25 µs; however, there are only two sets of values transmitted, one to each converter,
resulting potentially in around 10,000 messages per second (a message every 10 to 25 µs).
The latency between a measured torque and motor speed values and the reception of the
correlated control command by each of the DC/DC converters constitutes the distributed
control loop delay experienced by the power system.
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Figure 8: Architecture of microgrid communication networks.
The secondary controller would contribute significantly to the delay budget. The con-
troller would have to interface with the wide-area control network via IP addressing, resulting
in full IP stack included in the real-time operating system, and therefore, a slower runtime
cycle. One possible way to avoid a slowdown in the cycle for the microgrid network interface
is to have two execution cycles running in the embedded real-time operating systems of the
controller. The processes should run on two physically separated processors communicating
possibly via shared memory channels (Figure 9). This would allow the inside microgrid
loop controller to operate on a much higher frequency, by only implementing MAC layer
addressing and omitting encryption/decryption operations (steps (2) and (6) in Figure 9).
On other hand, the outside network application would (1) query the outside interface (IP
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Layer), (2) decrypt information, (3) read the logical channel for any message from inside the
microgrid, (4) execute control logic, (5) write to the logical channel, (6) encrypt data and
(7) write to the outside interface at the end of it’s cycle. The inside loop controller would
(1) receive network messages, (3) check the logical channel for any control instruction from
the tertiary controller, (4) execute logic, (5) write messages to the tertiary controller, (7)
and output messages to the appropriate local microgrid network port. Even by separating
the controllers in order to gain performance, it is unlikely that the inside communication
cycle would be able to keep up with the 10 to 20 µs message frequency. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the inside communication execution cycle would be of at least 10
millisecond, and the outside communication cycle would be around 20 millisecond [55].
Figure 9: Secondary Controller’s inside and outside communication cycles.
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3.1.2 Wide-area Control Network
The tertiary controller would be in charge of balancing energy supply and demand between
the onshore grid, wind farms, and one or more microgrids. In the event of insufficient wind
generation, the tertiary control would initialize backup energy supply, via the diesel genera-
tor located in each microgrid, in order to continue non-interrupted drilling operations. The
tertiary controller would be a distributed control system, with each microgrid having a ded-
icated top level controller (Figure 10). Due to the possibly large geographical area, resulting
in a number of separate networks, the communication network would require IP addressing
and significant security protocols. Contrary to the local microgrid control network, which
creates messages with a deterministic high frequency, the wide-area control network would
be of a non-deterministic nature. Two major types of messages would be present: keep alive
between different sub-systems, and command/failure notifications. The keep alive message
would be with a range between milliseconds and seconds. The control and failure messages
are stochastic in nature as a result of changing wind directions and intensity or other natural
phenomenon, as well as hardware and software failures.
Due to the size and the distributed architecture, security becomes an issue as well as
interconnectivity and scalability. One wind farm may be connected to two or more oil plat-
forms, and a tertiary control may communicate between multiple wind farms and platforms.
Functionality provided by the IP layer would be needed here for session establishment and
maintenance. Data encryption and authentication is vital for security protection. The net-
work is assumed to be using UDP, and not TCP as transmission protocol. Retransmissions
are not employed. In case of packet loss, the receiver would take into account the follow
up packet. A retransmit packet will contain stale information, data too old to be acted
upon, by the time it is received. Furthermore, in case of TCP it is possible to flood the
network with retransmitted packets, creating congestion. This is due to the fact that TCP
uses principle design to avoid loss in non-critical networks. The protocol tends to be over
active and too aggressive in time-critical networks. Hence, the applications at the end points
need to be robust enough in order to tolerate packet losses, up to a safe predefined number,
and continue normal operation.
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Figure 10: Architecture of wide-area communication network.
3.2 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRIBUTED
COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE
Communication networks are evaluated in terms of four factors - efficiency, latency, avail-
ability and reliability, and security. In the following section, we discuss each communication
technology and evaluate the performance based on those parameters. Throughout the re-
mainder of this section please refer to Table 6 for a summary of the information.
3.2.1 Availability and Reliability
Availability in communication networks is the percentage of time in which the network is in a
specified operational state. The most simple representation, shown by (23), of availability is







The above calculation is applied for a communication networks that do not have built in
back-up paths. For networks with more then one path between source and destination pair,





where Api is the availability of the i th path. In general, parallel networks are always
more reliable, however they are much more expensive to implement. For the availability
calculation in the microgrid and wide-area communication networks, we assume single path
networks. Unlikely in reality, however it is important to analyze this base case in order to
gain understanding of media options and their suitability.
3.2.2 Packet Size and Overhead
Efficiency is defined as the fraction of useful data bits out of the total bits transmitted.
The extra bits are control information and they are referred to as overhead. There are
two communication protocols employed in the network design (1) inside the microgrid (2)
outside the microgrid/inside the wide-area. The goal of the former protocol is speed and
reliability with minimal overhead. The goal of the latter is also speed and reliability, however
some performance is sacrificed for the purposes of interoperability and security. In the
communication protocol within the microgrid we assume that Ethernet is adopted and 42
bytes are used for the payload. This is the minimum allowed by the MAC protocol. There are
an additional 42 bytes of mandatory MAC header. The overall efficiency is 50%, which is low,
and a result of the small payload of every packet. This can be corrected by buffering some
measurements and sending them in a single packet. This, however, goes against the real-time
principle of the applications. Low efficiency is typical of such applications (real-time audio
and video). In the wide-area network the payload would be 512 bytes (the minimum for
UDP Packets), with additional 70 bytes of headers. The payload would also be encrypted,
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however private key encryption does not expand the data it encrypts. The overall efficiency
is much higher, around 90%. However, due to the larger packet size, there would be larger
transmission delay.
Table 3: Summary of telecommunication protocols and media options for Microgrid and
Wide-area networks.
Microgrid Network Wide-area Grid Protocol
Ethernet Fiber Wimax Satellite Microwave
Addressing MAC IP
Message Packet Type MAC UDP
Retransmissions - -
Range (up to) 250 miles [56] 100’s of miles [56] 10 miles [57] 100’s of miles [58] 30 miles [59]
Security Physical Public and Private Key Encryption, Message Authentication
Payload 42 bytes (minimum) 512 bytes (minimum)
Overhead per Message 42 bytes (MAC) 42 bytes (MAC) + 20 bytes (IP) + 8 bytes (UDP)
Transmission Rate (bits/sec) 1 Gbps 1 Gbps 40 Mbps 1 Mbps 45 Mbps
Message Transmission Delay (estimate) 0.6 µsec/link 4.6 µsec/link 120 µsec/link >10 msec/link [58] 100 µsec/link
Link Availability (up to) 0.99999 [56] 0.9999 [56] 0.99 0.95 [60] 0.99 [59]
Oneway End-to-End Availability (up to) 0.99998 (2 links) 0.999 1 0.9 1 0.59 1 0.9 1
Protocols End-to-End Delay (estimate) ≈ 10 msec (2 links) ≈ 100 msec 1 ≈ 100 msec 1 > 150 msec 1 ≈ 100 msec 1
3.2.3 Transmission Delays
There would be a number of sources of delay in the network - transmission delay, processing
delay in the intermediate notes, and encryption/decryption delay (only for the wide-area net-
work). Out of those, the transmission delay would be the least significant, and the processing
delay the most. In the wide-area network there would be around 13 µs delay for private key
encryption per message (assuming low level FPGA implementation of AES/Rijndael [61]),
and another 4 ms [62] for authentication of the data. Assuming the real-time system can
achieve, and that is a reasonable assumption [55], 10 ms per cycle for the inside interface, and
15 ms for the outside plus an additional 5 ms for encryption and authentication. This would
result in around 10-11 ms delay for one hop end-to-end delay for the microgrid network, and
100 ms for the wide-area network.
1 All Wide-area availability and delay calculations assume that logical channels between two micro-
grids use the following path: two links inside the first Microgrid and pass through Secondary and Tertiary
Controllers, one link between the two microgrids, pass through second microgrid’s Secondary and Tertiary
Controllers and two links inside the second microgrid (Figures 8 and 10).
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3.2.4 Security
As stated previously, security results in too much overhead and delay and is unlikely to be
used in the microgrid network. The assumption here is that the microgrid network would
be contained in one physical location - the offshore platform. As such, the cyber security
is replaced by physical security (e.g. locked cabinets for the equipment, and steel cable
enclosures).
In the tertiary network, encryption is necessary due to the fact that the network has
a large geographical span, possibly connecting multiple networks owned by different opera-
tors, and potential use of a wireless communication technology. Wireless signals are easily
intercepted and fabricated, and they have to be encrypted to prevent malicious behavior.
There exist two encryption paradigms - public and private key encryption. The advantage
of public key encryption is that two parties communicating with each other have their own
separate keys. As such data encrypted by a party is also signed by that party, and cannot
be later denied or produced by a third party. The downside of public key encryption is that
it has quite slow decryption and especially slow encryption procedures. As such it is not
used for large data streams. In comparison, private key cryptography is significantly faster,
up to speeds of 3 Gbps [61], however both parties share the same key. Therefore, data is
not signed and can be denied, or knowledge of the secret key allows a third party to join the
communication undetected.
A common practice in security protocols is to use public key encryption in the initial
communication setup, agree on a private key, and switch to private key encryption. Since
public keys are individual, there is a need for key management intermediary, a Certificate
Authority, that is in charge of distributing, renewing and retiring keys. The microgrid
communication network would have to be protected by a firewall and a intrusion detection
system (IDS). This is especially important, since inside the microgrid network there is no
data encryption. Under no conditions, should an outside communication channel be allowed
in those non-encrypted networks. The secondary controller should be the only channel of
communication inside and outside the microgrid network. Deviation of this rule could result
in adversary issuing plain text control commands to the DC/DC converters and damaging
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the induction machines.
Private key set up delays, due to key negotiation and public key encryption, prior to
switching over to private key encryption are out of the scope of this paper. The assumption
here is that the session has been established.
3.3 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented a communication network architecture for managing power supplied to
an oil drilling platform through means of offshore wind generation. These system components
can behave as a practical microgrid scenario. A number of different technology options with
theoretical bounds were laid out. Future work would investigate those cases, as well as
normal operation of the two networks, electrical and telecommunications, in co-simulated
hybrid environments. The communication network performance would dictate functionality
assignment between different sub-systems. For instance, certain function require delay unable
to be provided by the communication system, and therefore the only possible assignment
would be in the primary controller. The drawback of primary controller functions is that
they operate in a non-collaborative fashion requiring higher safety margins in the overall
system design. Functionality assigned to the secondary controller can take more accurate
decisions and reduce overhead.
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4.0 MICROGRID SECURE REAL-TIME COMMUNICATION
Microgrids have been proposed as a method to provide continuity of power to key societal
and commercial locations (e.g., hospitals, military bases, etc.) and as a means to incorporate
distributed energy generation such as wind and solar [63–65]. The basic building blocks of
microgrids include the ability to connect to and from the power grid, electrical loads and
a back-up energy supply (e.g., renewables, fuel cells, etc.). A fundamental requirement of
microgrids is operating in stand-alone (i.e., island) and grid connected modes. In island
mode, the microgrid control system provides frequency and voltage stability for optimal
power flow, and ensures minimal load shedding and disruption during transition from grid
connected to island mode. Furthermore, the microgrid should have the ability to move back
from island to grid-connected mode, resulting in re-synchronization with minimum impact
to sensitive loads.
Providing reliable and secure communications among the microgrid components and
between the microgrid and the larger grid is a requirement for the microgrid to function.
Of particular concern is the communications supporting the microgrid control systems. In
the literature, [66–69] provide overviews of the distributed hierarchical control layers within
microgrids, namely: primary, secondary and tertiary control layers. The primary control is
responsible for maintaining voltage and frequency stability of the microgrid subsequent to
changes in the system mode. The secondary control layer should compensate for the voltage
and frequency deviations caused by the operation of the primary control layer. Finally the
tertiary control layer manages the power flow between the microgrid and the main grid,
coordinates with adjacent microgrids and facilitates optimal operation.
In general, each control layer is comprised of separate physical entities with differing
computational resources. In implementing such a control architecture, the controllers at the
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top of the hierarchy take state input from lower layers and compute parameters that maybe
passed to controllers at lower levels for their local control actions. Note that the control
layers work on different time scales with real-time delay constraints for information exchange
within and between layers. Hence the communications between the control elements are
time critical in nature implying the need for efficient algorithms that minimize the delay
and computational resource requirements. Furthermore, the communication and security
architectures must be versatile enough to support various communication patterns among
control components, namely: unicast, multi-cast and broadcast communications.
Here we propose a secure communication architecture tailored to the microgrid control
system. The main contributions of the paper include the following. We formally define a
microgrid communication security model. We propose a security architecture that supports
the hierarchical structure of microgrid control mechanisms and takes the resource constraints
into account while respecting the real-time communication requirements. Moreover, we de-
sign a security protocol that supports broadcast, multicast and unicast communications.
The proposed solution provides data confidentiality and authentication while meeting the
real-time communication needs within the microgrid. The implementation of the proposed
scheme is discussed and compared with other approaches in the literature through theo-
retical comparison and a co-simulation analysis of a target microgrid. Our results indicate
that the new security scheme outperforms its counterparts either in terms of computational
efficiency or storage requirements. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II presents background material on microgrids and the challenges they present. Section III
provides an overview of related literature. Section IV presents the system, data and attack
models. Section V outlines the new security protocol, followed by Section VI, which provides
performance results. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section VII.
4.1 BACKGROUND
As a motivating example, we draw on our recent work [70, 71] which proposed a medium
voltage DC microgrid system to supply power to a set of offshore production platforms.
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The loads on a offshore platform include large motors used for propulsion, station keeping,
drilling, and pumping product to the surface, as well as auxiliary on-site functions (e.g.,
lighting, HVAC, etc.). The microgrid power system architecture is shown in Fig. 11. The
main local source of electricity is provided by a group of 5 MW wind-turbines that produce
AC current. Also a backup diesel generator maybe incorporated on each platform. The AC
from the wind-farm is converted to DC through a three-level neutral point clamped rectifier
that establishes the 5 kV DC bus voltage. Interfacing the DC bus and offshore production
platform are two bidirectional DC/DC converters. These converters transform DC voltages
within the architecture and serve as channels for power to flow that are controller regulated.
The major load on a platform is a set of MW class induction motor drives used to propel the
drilling mechanism, propulsion and station keeping, and these can be modeled as constant
power loads. The primary controllers of the motors uses a decoupled dq axis control to
regulate both machine flux and current. The primary controllers provide measurements to
the secondary controller, which controls the power supply to the DC/DC converters. The
details of the control algorithms are given in [70].
Figure 11: Offshore production platform microgrid with offshore wind power.
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In general, a set of offshore platforms (e.g., a oil field) will be powered by a windfarm
leading to a system of interconnected microgrids. Fig. 12 adapted from [71] illustrates the
control and communication architectures of the system. Inside the microgrid for the purposes
of power regulation and protection, the communication architecture provides a number of
logical communication channels: primary controller to the secondary controller; secondary
controller to the DC/DC converters, backup generator, voltage regulator and breakers. In
order to facilitate power flow in and out of the microgrid, the secondary controller provides
information and receives profiles from the tertiary controller. A tertiary controller communi-
cates with the tertiary controllers of other microgrids and the main grid as shown in Fig. 12.
Note that there may be a mix of organizations owning and operating the set of microgrids,
the main grid and the wind-farm.
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Figure 12: Offshore platform microgrid control and communication architecture.
The communication network provides the means for the microgrid control elements to
signal among the components in order for the microgrids to operate, coexist and connect to
the main grid. The requirements of the communication network to support control signaling
are: real-time performance guarantees, evaluated via worst case delay performance analysis;
security, providing confidentiality and integrity guarantees while respecting the real-time de-
lay boundaries; and high availability. Given the presence of high bandwidth communication
networks, most of the delay in communication is introduced by the embedded control sub-
systems that govern the flow of control messages and the execution of control logic. Many
of the elements in the control systems are so called intelligent electrical devices (IED) such
as voltage regulators, protective relays and recloser controllers, that contain low level mi-
croprocessors with small memories and have equipment lifetimes measured in decades. The
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execution cycles of such controllers must be considered in the design of a security architecture
as they limit the type of confidentiality and integrity methods employed.
In the general microgrid context, the time scale of the primary control operation is in
msecs. Semi-independent primary control is needed with the controller taking into account
commands from the secondary controller at a frequency in the range of tens of msecs or
more [72]. For example, the secondary control would implement demand response as con-
sumption in the microgrid increases, or supply from renewable energy decreases. The sec-
ondary controllers are expected to operate five to ten times slower or more than the primary
controllers. Finally, the tertiary control layer manages the power flow between the microgrid
and the main grid and between adjacent microgrids to facilitate optimal operation. High
level commands that involve the tertiary control are measured in seconds, or even minutes.
4.2 RELATED WORK
The literature on cyber security for smart grid systems was recently surveyed in [73] and here
we highlight relevant work. One major document addressing security for time-critical smart
grid communication is IEC 62351 [74]. Released to build on top of IEC 61850 [75], it attempts
to address the shortcomings of [75] in terms of cyber security for substation automation
systems (SAS). The standard discusses data authentication via digital signatures, access
control, security measures to prevent eavesdropping, prevention of playback and spoofing and
intrusion detection. IEC 62351 specifies a variant of the Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA)
algorithm, a public key infrastructure (PKI) cryptography algorithm for SAS communication.
According to [74], the sender hashes the time-critical message using a secure hash algorithm
(SHA-256) and then encrypts the hash with a private key via RSA in order to generate
a signature. On the receiving end, the device hashes the message once again, decrypts
the signed hash with the sender’s public key, compares the received hash with the locally
created one, and if the two hashed values match, it accepts the message as valid. However,
the standard fails to meet the 3 ms end-to-end delivery requirement of IEC 61850 and thus
far has little industry acceptance [76].
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Recently, a number of publications [77–79] have focused on time-constrained secure com-
munication. Three types of techniques have been proposed: (1) RSA based approaches,
similar to IEC 62351; (2) message authentication code (MAC) schemes, leveraging symmet-
ric security; and (3) one-time signature (OTS) protocols, making use of hash functions.
MAC based schemes leverage a common symmetric key between a sender and receiver
pair. One popular MAC base approach is Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authenti-
cation (TESLA) [77]. The TESLA protocol divides time into separate periods. The sender
uses different keys to sign the messages in each epoch. Once the key has expired, the sender
releases the key to the public, thus allowing the receivers to verify any buffered messages.
After the key is public, the sender needs to move onto the next key. The advantage of
this protocol is the multicast, characteristic allowing a single message to be verified by
multiple recipients. However, the buffering requirements make this protocol unsuitable for
microgrid real-time communication. An alternative MAC principle based approach uses the
incomplete-set-scheme principle [80]. For every receiver, the transmitter has a separate short
key. The sender signs a single message with all the private keys to all the recipients. To
verify a message, each receiver uses the individual private key to create a local MAC and
compares it to the received MAC. Since only the message sender has the full set of private
keys, no other member of the communication cluster can fabricate the sender’s identity. This
protocol suffers from communication overhead, for n receivers we need n MACs in each mes-
sage. However, it provides excellent computational performance due to its use of symmetric
cryptography.
A number of OTS schemes have been proposed in the literature, such as [78, 79]. At
the core, they all try to address the issues of "one-timed-ness" and the large public key
size. Wang et al [81] have proposed TV-HORS which uses pre-computed hash chains to
authenticate data. The protocol creates a logical mapping between the data to the pre-
computed hash values. However it requires a large number of pre-computations resulting in
long bootstrap times and large storage requirements. Furthermore, TV-HORS has a short
key lifetime, which when coupled with the bootstrap time and storage requirements makes
the protocol a poor fit for resource constrained applications.
The literature mentioned above focuses on either real time systems security or general
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smart grid security. Currently there is little microgrid specific security research [73] outside
of [82]. This is especially true for industrial size microgrids such as studied here. In [82] a
survey of microgrid protocols, architectures, equipment and security threats is given. The
authors propose an architecture defining interfaces and points for cyber security mecha-
nisms by grouping microgrid equipment into enclaves based on their functionality. They
note the crucial need to secure the microgrid control system communications. However,
the real-time nature of the communications, the resource limitations of IEDs and the dis-
tributed hierarchical nature of the microgrid control systems are not addressed. Here, we
note that the IEDs are the bottleneck of the electrical and communications co-system and
as such develop a security solution that limits end-device computation and storage at the
expense of communication overhead. We follow the principles laid out by the MAC based
incomplete-set-schemes, which make use of symmetric cryptography, and provide computa-
tional efficiency.
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Table 4: Notation table.
Parameter Definition
S, Ri, n sender, i-th receiver, and total number of receivers
td
Time to deliver a message by the network (including S and
R transmission times, and intermediate network
propagation times)
tS Sender’s packetization (encryption + signing) delay
tR Receiver’s processing (decryption + verification) delay
tied Time to execute cycle of IED’s control logic application
taes
IED’s computation speed of encryption/decryption
operation for the AES algorithm (in MiB/sec)
tcmac
IED’s computation speed for creating AES-CMAC
signature (in MiB/sec)
dmsg Size of message (in bits)
tmax Maximum end-to-end delay bound
KS Trusted microgrid key management server
kbi Symmetric bootstrap key for IEDi know to KS and IEDi
kksi Symmetric confidentiality key known to KS and IEDi
kc Microgrid shared confidentiality key
Ni Nonce generated by IEDi
N ′i
Nonce generated by IEDi to prevent replay attacks
(different from Ni)
v(i,j) Authentication tag key between IEDi and IEDj
Hv(i,j) Function for creation of authentication tag
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4.3 SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODELS
We adopt the system scenario illustrated in Fig. 13. The microgrid network is assumed to
be behind the meter and may have a different owner than the other networks it interconnects
with, which are assumed in worst case fashion to be insecure and lossy. As shown in Fig.
13, we consider a multicast communication scenario with a single sender S and multiple
receivers Ri, i = 1, 2, ...n (note - unicast and broadcast are special cases of multicast). Table
4 summarizes the notation we adopt for the system model.
Figure 13: Network model.
In Fig. 14, we show the end to end communication model. Controllers and IEDs
communicate by making use of the UDP/IP protocol stack as is standard practice in real-time
systems [83]. In such environments, TCP/IP is undesirable, since in the case of lost packet,
by the time the retransmission reaches the intended receiver, the data is stale. Reliability
is achieved via periodic transmission of data. In the model of Fig. 14, the network delivery
delay is defined as td and includes the propagation and transmission delays. We use tS
to denote the time it takes a device to packetize and send a message after it has been
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passed down from the device’s application. Additionally, we define tR as the time it takes to
process the incoming message and pass it to the receiver’s application. We define tmax, as
the maximum end to end delay for all receivers of a message, where for successful delivery
tS + td + tR < tmax. In the event, the end to end delay of a message exceeds tmax it is
discarded. In general, tmax is determined such that the microgrid power control can be
designed to operate in a stable fashion. Note, that the end to end communication delay
depends on many factors: the computational capability of the IEDs’ hardware; the real-
time operating systems; the application execution times; the speed of the communication
links; and the topology and congestion status of the communication network.
Figure 14: End to end communications model within microgrid
We classify the data in the microgrid network into three types: (1) messages carrying
sampled data (e.g., current, etc.), (2) safety messages facilitating emergency power operations
(e.g., opening a circuit breaker to prevent overload), and (3) control messages setting profiles
for operation of the power network. We focus on the control messages as the data model
since they pose the most demanding real-time delivery requirements. Each message has the
following properties: (1) sender S has no prior knowledge of the message contents before
packet generation; (2) each message is of broadcast or multicast nature; (3) all messages
use UDP/IP and there are no re-transmissions; (4) each message is timestamped by the
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sender S; (5) Ri accepts the message if it is delivered and verified within tmax and rejects it
otherwise.
It is assumed that all IEDs involved in electrical systems protection, operate in fail-
safe mode. In the absence of communication, each protection IED would take independent
protective actions. Lastly, we assume there exists a trusted third party that facilitates initial
key exchange between devices that are not owned by the same entities, such as one microgrid
to another, or between a microgrid and the main grid.
As an attack model, we assume an adversary has the following goals: (1) to inject
a counterfeit message or to modify an existing message; (2) to intercept and to drop a
legitimate message; (3) to passively collect information from messages between S and Ri.
To achieve those objectives, we assume that the adversary has the following capabilities: full
access to the microgrid network, the adversary can capture, drop, delay, resend or eavesdrop
on some or all packets, the adversary can gain access to S or Ri and learn any key material.
4.4 MICROGRID SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
The goal of the proposed security architecture is to allow a sender S to send authenticated
and confidential messages to one or more Ri over the microgrid and associated networks. This
means, that within tmax, each Ri can decrypt and verify every received message using the
computational resources at its disposal. If an adversary injects, replays or modifies a message,
each Ri should recognize the faulty message and discard it. The proposed architecture is
simple by design as microgrid communications systems should be easily deployed and require
little management. The architecture requires a standalone key management server (KS) in
each microgrid. Since both confidentiality and authentication/integrity are provided there
are two types of keys used in communications. The confidentiality key is shared among a
group, so that every group member can read the messages. The authentication keys are point-
to-point between S and Ris. In order to achieve multicast communication S has a separate
authentication key for each Ri. For purposes of clarity, any key used for a confidentiality
encryption operation is referred to as k and any key used for creating an authentication tag
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is indicated by v.
4.4.1 Key Bootstrapping
For communication bootstrapping, the protocol adopts a modified version of the Needham-
Schroeder protocol [84]. The modified version is safe against replay attacks, due to the use of
an additional nonce N ′. Each IED comes with factory printed bootstrap key kbi (e.g., 192-
bit AES key). At the time of installation, the technician enters the IED’s bootstrap key into
the microgrid’s key management server. Once connected to the network, the IEDi sends
a kbi encrypted join request to the microgrid’s key management server KS. In response,
KS send back the microgrid’s shared confidentiality communication key kc and the IED’s
individual confidentiality key kksi . These steps are illustrated below.
IEDi → KS : {IEDi, Ni}kbi (1)
KS → IEDi : {IEDi, Ni, kc, kksi}kbi (2)
In order to communicate with other IEDs on the network, the IEDi sends a session boot-
strap request to the IEDj. IEDj responds with a nonce encrypted under their personal
confidentiality key kksj .
IEDi → IEDj : {IEDi}kc (3)
IEDj → IEDi : {IEDi, N ′j}kksj (4)
The original IED forwards to the key server the two devices’ IDs, a nonce and the token
received from the other IED. The KS generates an authentication tag key v(i,j) for the
new session, updates the token from IEDj to contain the key, and sends back to IEDi the
encrypted message.
IEDi → KS : {IEDi, IEDj, Ni, (5)
{IEDi, N ′j}kksj }kc
KS → IEDi : {IEDj, Ni, v(i,j), (6)
{IEDi, N ′j, v(i,j)}kksj }kksi
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In the final step, the encrypted session information is forwarded back to IEDj. The au-
thentication session key is confirmed by doing a simple arithmetic operation on the nonce
between the two peers.
IEDi → IEDj : {{IEDi, N ′j, v(i,j)}kksj }kc (7)
IEDj → IEDi : {Nj, {Nj}v(i,j)}kc (8)
IEDi → IEDj : {Nj − 1, {Nj − 1}v(i,j)}kc (9)
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4.4.2 Communication
The communication protocol follows the principle of encrypt-then-MAC [85]. This is done for
two reasons: there is no need to encrypt the authentication tag, thus avoiding unnecessary
encryption for S; and second, Ri can verify the message without decryption of the data and
discard any fake messages. We present the steps for unicast and multicast communication
in turn below.
Unicast Communications
Unicast communications is the normal mode for communications between IEDs and the
primary controllers.
IEDi encrypts the message with kc (10)
{m}kc = Ekc(m)
IEDi creates individual authentication tag (11)
{m}(i,j) = Hv(i,j)({m}kc)
IEDi → IEDj : [{m}kc ||{m}(i,j)] (12)
IEDj creates digest from the received message (13)
{m}′(i,j) = Hv(i,j)({m}kc)
IEDj compares the local and the received digest (14)
IF ({m}(i,j) = {m}′(i,j))
IEDj accepts the message (15)
ELSE
IEDj rejects the message
END
Multicast/Broadcast Communication
As discussed earlier, some portion of the communication is multicast or broadcast in
nature. Here, multicast communication is achieved at the expense of overhead. For multicast
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communication S emulates a multicast protocol by creating individual authentication digests
for each IEDi within the microgrid. The creation of each authentication tag requires separate
pair-wise keys. This is done for two primary reasons: first, each IEDi can verify the origin
of a message; and second, in the event of an IEDi security breach, only the key material for
that particular device is compromised and not for the entire microgrid. The protocol goes
as follows:
Same as unicast communication (10) (16)
FOR EACH Ri: (17)
IEDi creates message authentication tag
{m}(i,x) = Hv(i,x)({m}kc)
END FOR
IEDi →Microgrid : [{m}kc ||{m}(i,j)..||{m}(i,n)] (18)
EACH Ri (19-21)
Same as unicast communication (13) - (15)
4.5 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In order to evaluate the proposed security protocol, we consider specific algorithms for its
implementation and contrast it with RSA (PKI), the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
(which is also used in PKI) and TV-HORS (OTS).
4.5.1 Bootstrapping and Key size
The parameters used to calculate the performance are listed in Table 5 and are based on a 600
MHz microprocessor widely used in embedded systems such as power grid IEDs. We adopt
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommendation to limit the key
lifetime by requiring that at least 248 message operations prior to a single message collision
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occurring. For the proposed scheme we use the AES algorithm for message confidentiality
and the AES-based CMAC algorithm for message authentication [86]. A 192-bit AES key
is recommended for data confidentiality and CMAC based authentication, ensuring that the
probability of forgery is quite low and the lifetime of the keys exceeds the lifetime of IED
equipment. In the proposed algorithm, the bootstrap procedure is individual between each
peer, thus it is linear to the number of IEDs in the microgrid. In comparison for a PKI
system to achieve the minimum required key lifetime, RSA needs at least 2048 bit key and
DSA a 256 bit key [87]. Also, in PKI the sender bootstraps once for all receivers. The OTS
protocol used for comparison is TV-HORS, due to its superior performance over other OTS
algorithms [88]. In order to achieve the NIST specified key lifetime security level, TV-HORS
requires a key of at least 500 KBytes [81]. In the target offshore platform microgrid system
each primary controller sends one message every 80 msec, or 13 messages/sec.
Following [81] one can show the minimal time to bootstrap the key for TV-HORS is 120
sec and the lifetime of the key is only 840 seconds. Thus, for every 14 minutes of operation
each IED would have to pause sending data and bootstrap again the keys for 2 minutes.
Of course, it is possible to increase the length of the key chains and therefore increase the
lifetime of the keys, however the storage requirements and bootstrap times increase as well.
Lu et al., stated similar findings in regards to using TV-HORS for substation communication
security [89]. Hence, TV-HORS is not a practical security solution for the target microgrid
environment.
4.5.2 Theoretical Comparative Performance
While there is no benchmark standard for tmax in microgrids, we assume it to be 3 ms in
accordance with IEC 61850. A comparative analysis is presented in Table 6. The second
column in Table 6 lists the number of keys an IED needs to store for the various security
methods. If there are n devices in the microgrid, then for the proposed scheme each IED
would be required to store kc, two KS update keys, and 2(n − 1) individual session keys
(i.e.,(n−1) authentication keys and (n−1) session keys). Note, that in the proposed scheme
the KS needs to store one cluster kc and n(n− 1) session keys.
53
Table 5: Security Algorithms time performance statistics. [2] Please note, that we assume
SHA-256 performance to be on par with 192-AES. Due to the lack of SHA-256 performance
statistic on the target platform we make this safe assumption.
OpenSSL performance statistics for VIA Eden 600Mhz
Microgrid message payload (dmsg) [71] 42 bytes
Time for 192-AES encryption/decryption 0.008 msec
Time for 192-AES CMAC auth. tag 0.008 msec
Time for SHA-256 digest 0.007 msec
Time for RSA 2048 signature 312.5 msec
Time for RSA 2048 signature verification 9.1 msec
Time for DSA signature 91.7 msec
Time for DSA signature verification 111.1 msec
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Table 6: Comparison of microgrid security schemes
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For the calculation of IED’s packetization latency tS, we only consider encryption and
authentication tag creation delays. On the receiver side, tR, we only consider the time it
takes to verify a message. For both metrics, TV-HORS has the fastest performance due to
precomputation. In the proposed scheme, tS increases linearly with the number of receivers,
however, receiver verification consists of one authentication tag and one decryption operation.
In the RSA and DSA cases, both the packetization and verification delays exceed the 3 ms
end-to-end delay requirement. Hence, PKI algorithms are not be suitable candidates for
microgrids.
The main drawback of the proposed scheme is the communication overhead introduced
by the need to transmit separate point-to-point authentication tags in multicast communica-
tions. Towards minimizing the overhead, we make use of AES-CMAC-96 [90] with truncated
96-bit output authentication tags (while still using 192-bit keys for tag creation). Compared
to the RSA approach, which has flat communication overhead of 2048-bit per message, our
proposed protocol, has overhead that is linear to n in the broadcast case. However, for up to
n = 20 the new scheme has less communication overhead than RSA. Finally, TV-HORS has
flat overhead of a pre-configured number of SHA-256 messages digests per single authentica-
tion tag. For the data rates in question, the minimum feasible message digests per signature
is eleven [79].
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In the microgrid of Fig. 12, the communication network connects the following IEDs: 10
primary controllers (assuming 4 MW drilling platform and 400 kW DC induction motors);
secondary and tertiary controllers; the voltage regulator and the DC generator controllers;
two DC/DC converters; 27 circuit breakers and a KS. This results in less than 50 IEDs.
We define the application execution time of an IED as tied, the primary controller time as
tpri, the secondary controller as tsec, the tertiary controller as tter, the DC/DC converter
as tconv, and the voltage regulator as treg. A control loop execution time is defined as the
time between when a measurement is emitted from the sensing IED until an adjustment
command is delivered to the acting IED. Here we focus on the primary-secondary and
tertiary-secondary control loops. Since the data rates of IED equipment within the microgrid
network are low (10-100 kbps) in comparison to the link bandwidths (.1-10 Gbps), we assume
the communication network is congestion free and ignore any intermediate router/switch
buffering delays.
4.5.2.1 Primary-Secondary Control Loop The primary controller at each motor pro-
vides torque and rotor speed measurements to the secondary controller every tpri seconds.
The secondary controller collects all the measured data, then calculates the appropriate duty
cycles for each of the two DC/DC converters to alter the power flow to the machine loads.
The latency between the measured torque and motor speed values and the adjustment of the
power supplied by the DC/DC converters constitutes the primary-secondary control com-
munication loop delay Tpri−sec. This is illustrated in Fig. 15. The primary controllers, as
well as the two DC/DC converters, execute in parallel. However, the secondary controller
has to process all the incoming data from the primary controllers before it can act, therefore,
occurring an additional delay of npri · tR (where npri is the number of primary controllers in
the microgrid). Hence, the controller loop latency Tpri−sec is
Tpri−sec = tpri + tsec + tconv + 2 · tS + 2 · td + (npri + 1) · tR (22)
Utilizing Table 5 and assuming 100 Mbps communication links, the one-hop propagation
delay td is approximately equal to 0.05 ms. Further, taking values from the literature we
set tsec = 500 ms, tconv = 500 ms [69] and tpri = 80 ms [72]. For the proposed security
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architecture, the resulting control loop delay is Tpri−sec ≈ 1080 ms. By comparison, if RSA
(PKI) is used the control loop delay is Tpri−sec ≈ 1805 ms, which is just under the 2 sec
latency threshold given in [91] to ensure stable operation of the microgrid’s power network.
Figure 15: The microgrid’s primary-secondary distributed control loop.
4.5.2.2 Tertiary-Secondary Control Loop In a fashion similar to the above analysis,
we evaluate the tertiary-secondary control loop delay Tter−sec. The loop latency is expressed
as
Tter−sec = tter + tsec + tconv + 2 · tS + 2 · td + 2 · tR (23)
Assuming broadcast communications, with tter = 500 ms [72], the proposed protocol’s delay
is Tter−sec ≈ 1580 ms. However, if RSA is used instead, the loop delay is Tter−sec ≈ 2144 ms,
which exceeds the stable operation threshold.
4.5.3 Microgrid Co-Simulation Performance
A co-simulation of the offshore platform microgrid was developed in order to more accu-
rately evaluate the microgrid’s power control and communication network interaction. The
power system simulation [70] was developed in Matlab and exported as generated code. The
57
microgrid communication network was simulated using the Omnet++ simulation tool. The
communication network was modeled as a UDP/IP/Ethernet network with 100 Mbps links.
The interface between the two simulators was developed using a custom adaptive scheduler in
the ADEVS framework [92]. Note, that the interaction between the two networks occurs due
to the decision and action of the IEDs and controllers. Hence, the co-simulation scheduler
takes into account each IED′s individual computation speed, execution cycle sub-routines
and internal/external events, in order to determine the co-simulation synchronization points.
Figure 16: Maximum end-to-end delay vs. number of multicast receivers
The simulation results reported here were produced by running a power control test sce-
nario and varying the number of multicast receivers. In the scenario each primary controller
and induction motor starts at 1 second intervals. The secondary controller sends duty cycle
commands to the DC converters in order to compensate for the disturbance introduced by the
starting of the induction machines. After the microgrid power network is fully operational,
the microgrid transitions from island to grid connected mode.
Fig. 16 shows the maximum observed end-to-end delay (i.e., tS + td + tR) during a
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simulation run versus the number of multicast receivers for the proposed security scheme
(either using CMAC-192 or the truncated CMAC-96). Once can see that the end-to-end
delay is consistent with the theoretical analysis and well below the 3ms target. Next we
studied the primary-secondary control loop delay Tpri−sec for the case of all of the IEDs
active. The maximum observed Tpri−sec over the set of simulation runs is given in Table 7.
The observed delay is larger than the theoretical model, due to the simulation incorporating
the delay from intermediate nodes within the communication network, and the fact that
the secondary controller has to process all the received primary controller messages prior to
emitting any. We also include results for RSA and DSA, which are similar to the proposed
scheme in that the simulation delay is larger than the delay predicted by the theoretical
model. More importantly the RSA, DSA schemes result in unstable power system behavior,
since the Tpri−sec delay is too large. Note TV-HORS was not included as it results in the power
system being unstable due to the long bootstrap time which must be repeated frequently
given the limited key lifetime.
Table 7: Maximum distributed control loop delay
Protocol Distributed control loop delay
[Theoretical / Simulation]
CMAC-192 & CMAC-96 1080 / 1128.5 msec
RSA 1805 / 2093.7 msec unstable
DSA 2485 / 4424.3 msec unstable
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4.6 CONCLUSION
This paper presented a security architecture for the communication network that is needed
to facilitate microgrid power control operations. A security model, including network, data
and attack models, was formally defined. Based on the security model, we presented a
new security protocol to address the real-time communication needs of microgrids. The
implementation of the proposed security scheme was discussed and its performance was
compared to well accepted security protocols. It was shown that existing schemes are either
too slow or require too much memory for application in microgrids.
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5.0 MICROGRID CO-SIMULATION ARCHITECTURE
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Microgrids have been proposed as a method to incorporate distributed energy generation,
such as, wind and solar [93] into the power grid, as well as, a means to provide continuity
of power to key societal and commercial locations (e.g., hospitals, military bases, etc.). The
required building blocks of microgrids are the presence of a local energy source, loads, and
connectivity to the main grid. A fundamental requirement of microgrids is operating in
stand-alone (i.e., island) and grid-connected modes. In island mode, the microgrid control
system provides frequency and voltage stability for optimal power flow, and ensures minimal
load shedding and disruption during transition from grid-connected to island mode. Fur-
thermore, the microgrid should have the ability to move back from island to grid-connected
mode, resulting in re-synchronization with minimum impact to sensitive loads. All of these
operations are complex and require synchronized operation of different intelligent electrical
devices (IEDs) (e.g., voltage regulators, protective relays, etc.) through extensive communi-
cations.
Providing reliable and secure communications among the microgrid components and be-
tween the microgrid and the larger grid is a requirement for the microgrid to function. Of
particular concern is the communications supporting the microgrid control systems which
consist of distributed hierarchical control layers termed: primary, secondary and tertiary
control [94]. The primary control is responsible for maintaining voltage and frequency sta-
bility of the microgrid subsequent to changes in the system mode. The secondary control
layer should compensate for the voltage and frequency deviations caused by the operation
of the primary control layer. Finally the tertiary control layer manages the power flow be-
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tween the microgrid and the main grid, coordinates with adjacent microgrids and facilitates
optimal operation.
In general, each control layer is comprised of separate physical entities with differing
computational resources. In implementing such a control architecture, the controllers at
the top of the hierarchy take state input from lower layers and compute parameters that
maybe passed to controllers at lower levels for their local control actions. Note that the
control layers work on different time scales with real-time delay constraints for information
exchange within and between layers. Hence, the microgrid communications network must
be modeled in a detailed realistic fashion when evaluating the microgrid power control and
general operation.
However, most of the literature focuses on microgrid simulation from one perspective
(either power system or communications), while significantly abstracting the other one [95].
For instance, it is a common practice in power system publications [96, 97] to consider a
deterministic or random delay between the distributed controllers within a microgrid. Such
abstracted delays however do not take into account the specific communication properties
(e.g., queueing delay, packet loss), thus reducing the overall system fidelity and real world
usefulness of the results.
In this paper, we propose a novel co-simulation architecture to evaluate the performance
of microgrids in a high fidelity multidisciplinary fashion. We propose a dynamic time stepped
scheduler built around the execution of IEDs within the microgrid to synchronize power
system and communication network simulators. We illustrate our methodology using two off
the self simulation packages: MATLAB and OMNeT++. The proposed approach ensures
minimal simulation synchronization errors while still being computationally feasible.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we present background
material on existing smart grid co-simulation approaches. In Section 5.3, we describe an
example microgrid, our IED model, and associated simulation challenges. Next, Section
5.4 provides an overview of our proposed co-simulation architecture and discusses in detail
our novel dynamic scheduler. The co-simulation results are then provided in Section 5.5.
Conclusions are finally drawn in Section 5.6.
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5.2 RELATED WORK
Due to the lack of analytical tools and real world test beds for performance evaluation,
computer based simulation is expected become the standard tool for microgrid evaluation in
the forseeable future.
While a number of industry adopted mature power distribution simulators such as PSLF
and PowerWorld exist, as well as, a wide variety of communication network simulation tools
such as ns-3, ns-2 and OPNET, there is no holistic simulation environment that combines
both. A typical approach used in the scientific community is to interconnect independent
simulators in order to create a co-simulator. Usually, those efforts involve software packages
written in different programming languages that lack common data exchange interfaces. To
overcome this issue, researchers develop new middle layer software, often written in another
programming language to interconnect independent simulators. This leads to significant
performance degradation and limits the overall usefulness of the co-simulation environment.
As a result, co-simulations do not scale well, and mostly focus on trivial test cases.
Moreover, there is a significant problem with the co-simulation event schedulers. Usually,
two or more independent schedulers are used, one guiding the power network simulation,
another executing the communication network, and a third one to interface both. A typical
approach for the interface schedulers is to process events using a first-in first-out (FIFO)
queue in both networks. Early versions of such event-driven co-simulations use fixed time
steps to advance both simulators and execute all buffered events at once [98]. Example efforts
are EPOCHS [99], VPNET [100], and PowerNet [101]. Such an approach is undesirable for
simulations of involving real-time systems such as smart grids. In more recent efforts, GECO
offers a more realistic representation by sequentially simulating all power and communication
events via timestamps [102]. However, due to possible synchronization errors in the two
independent scheduling internal clocks and small time scales involved (in msecs), we argue
that such approaches are not precise enough to capture a given transient sequence of events.
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5.3 MICROGRID MODELING
As an example to provide context we draw on our recent work [10, 11], which proposed
a medium voltage DC microgrid system to supply power to a set of offshore production
platforms. The loads on a offshore platform include large motors used for propulsion, station
keeping, drilling, and pumping product to the surface, as well as auxiliary on-site functions
(e.g., lighting, HVAC, etc.). The basic microgrid architecture at a platform is depicted in
Fig. 17.
Figure 17: Power system and communication architecture for a given microgrid.
The main local source of electricity is provided by a group of 5 MW offshore wind-
turbines that produce AC current. The AC from the wind-farm is converted to DC through
a three-level neutral point clamped rectifier that establishes a 5 kV DC bus voltage.
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Interfacing the DC bus and offshore production platform are two bidirectional DC/DC
converters. These converters transform DC voltages within the architecture and serve as
channels for power to flow that are controller regulated. The major load on a platform is a
set of MW class induction motor drives used to propel the drilling mechanism, propulsion and
station keeping, and these can be modeled as constant power loads. The primary controllers
of the motors uses a decoupled dq axis control to regulate both machine flux and current.
The primary controllers provide measurements to the secondary controller, which controls
the the DC/DC converters. The details of the control algorithms are given in [10]
In modeling a microgrid the typical approach is to use separate but linked simulators for
the power and communication systems respectively. Often a fixed time step is used in both
simulators and depending on the selected time-step size, synchronization errors can occur.
To illustrate this, let us consider a simple example with two of the protection relays (IED1
and IED2) on either side of the DC/DC converter in Fig. 17. Consider a co-simulation
where each simulator uses fixed time steps, noted ∆T (Fig. 18). In the event of a power
surge at a motor in Fig. 17 both IEDs detect the transient. However, if IED1 is the one
next to the motor, it will trip instantaneously. After the protective action, IED1 sends a
message to inform IED2 on the other side of the DC/DC convertor to not trip. As per
power system operation, if IED2 still detects harmonics on the line after a given delay and
it has not yet received a trip notification from and IED on the other side of the convertor,
it must independently execute protective actions. Thus if ∆T is greater than the execution
cycle of both IEDs, the trip control message will not arrive on time at IED2. An alternative
approach is to decrease ∆T , however this leads to long simulation times, and therefore
limits the possibility to study many real world scenarios. For this reason, the simulation
environment needs to take into account the particular execution times of all IEDs in the
simulation.
From a high level perspective, an IED execution cycle consists of five sub-states (Fig. 19):
(i) read power network sensors, (ii) receive communication network packets, (iii) execute
control logic, (iv) execute power network protective and corrective actions, and (v) send
communication packets.
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Figure 18: Comparison between step-based and IED centered co-simulations.
Reading sensor inputs and energizing outputs from and to the power network is in the or-
der of microseconds and up to few milliseconds. An example of such operations is a brownout
protection, in which the IED detects voltage sag and injects additional power onto the power
bus. The power sensor reading delays are under a microseconds and, from a co-simulation
point of view, those delays are negligible. The delays associated with the reading and writing
data operations from the communications network can substantially take longer. The com-
munications delay consists of the data encryption/decryption, authentication, packetization
and depacketization, queuing, propagation, and transmission delays.
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Figure 19: High level execution cycle of an IED.
5.4 PROPOSED CO-SIMULATION ARCHITECTURE
In order to evaluation both the microgrid and communications network, we propose a co-
simulation architecture based on off-the-shelf simulators, namely OMNeT++ to model the
telecommunications network and MATLAB for the power system (Fig. 20). OMNeT++
is an extensible component-based open source simulation framework. More specifically, it
is an event-driven simulator supporting various application areas such as communications
networks, queueing networks, and hardware architectures. In order to integrate both OM-
NeT++ and MATLAB, we use A Discrete EVent System simulator (Adevs).
5.4.1 Atomic Models
One significant property of the proposed co-simulation model is the use of Adevs atomic
models. When a component is defined as atomic, an Adevs component is in charge of
executing the models in sequence up to a given specified time. Each IED in the microgrid




by an execution duration and reading and writing interactions with the communications
network. The sub-states are used to model the communications channels as well as the
security mechanisms employed.
Figure 20: Proposed co-simulation architecture.
The power network, implemented in MATLAB, is also imported as a single Adevs atomic
model. The investigated power network has the property of being nonlinear with respect
to the inputs and outputs. The nonlinearity comes from the fact that the power voltage
and current magnitudes changes as it travels through the transmission lines. Therefore,
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it is not possible to split the power network into multiple models with input and output
connections between them. Instead, the entire network is kept as a single model with input
and output channels. The MATLAB simulation is decomposed with fixed time steps, and
the co-simulator is in charge of setting inputs and reading outputs at every MATLAB cycle.
The order and the timing of reading and setting of the power network interfaces follow the
timing definition of each IED.
5.4.2 Co-Simulation Scheduler
There are two algorithms options for synchronization of both simulators and those are dis-
cussed in the following.
5.4.2.1 Fixed Time-Stepped Scheduler In order to compare the proposed dynamic
scheduler described shortly, we consider a conventional time-stepped scheduler. As depicted
in Fig. 18 (left side), such an approach decomposes the simulation time frame of both
simulators into time slots with duration ∆T . During a given time slot, no interaction is
done between both simulators. When a given time slot ends, the simulators can interact
each other. Therefore, if an event from a certain simulator during a time slot requires an
interaction with the other simulator, it is processed at the end of the time slot, thus creating a
synchronization error. To mitigate such errors, ∆T can be reduced, however the computation
complexity of the overall co-simulation increases.
5.4.2.2 Dynamic Time-Stepped Scheduler The co-simulation scheduler we propose
is in charge of the adaptive synchronization between both networks. The power network
has a fixed time step of ∆Tp. The communications network, however, is event-driven and
the time step is defined dynamically as ∆TC = tsync − tcurrent. An IED has two possible
interactions with the communications network: (i) send a packet and (ii) receive a packet.
First, when the simulation starts, the co-simulation scheduler finds the time of the upcom-
ing network event of any IED. We formally define tsync as the closest time to the current
simulation clock time, tcurrent, that one of the following actions occur at any IED: (i) finish
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the communications network writing operation and (ii) start the communications network
reading operation. Note that the writing operation has a fixed time delay and the reading
process has a variable delay, that depends on the number of received packets. Within the
microgrid, all communications are machine-to-machine (M2M). Therefore, the recipients of
the multicast messages are known in advance, and the packetization delay is also known. On
the contrary, the delay to read packets from the communications network is unknown. Note
that the delay is variable due to, in particular, the queuing delays and transmission losses.
Table 8: Symbol definitions of the dynamic co-simulation scheduler.
Symbol Definition
s(n,k) The k-th sub-cycle state of the n-th IED.
A Set of all ADEVS atomic models, A =
{IED1, IED2, ...IEDn, P}. P is the atomic model of
the power network.
currentState(.) Method returning the current cycle sub-state index of
an IED.
startT(.), endT(.) Methods returning the start and end times of a given
cycle sub-state.
writes(.), reads(.) Methods returning true or false if a sub-state is reading
or writing to the network.
interacts(.) Method that returns true is the sub-cycle state interacts
with the network or false otherwise.
Let us consider a co-simulation scenario involving two IEDs (IED1 and IED2), as de-
picted in Fig. 21. We assume that IED1 is a low-level open loop controller with short
control application sub-cycles. Also, IED1 does not receive any data from the communi-
cations network, but instead at the beginning of its cycle the device interrogates a power
network sensor.
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Once the control logic is finished power network outputs are energized and a control
packet is sent via the communications network. Let us assume also that IED2 is a slow con-
troller and uses inputs from IED1. In this example (Fig. 21), the simulation starts at t0 with
the boot-up of the devices. The co-simulation scheduler then determines the next time t2 at
which an IED interacts with the network, corresponding to the time when IED2 starts its
initial network reading procedure. The next synchronization point tsync is set and the com-
munications network simulation is allowed to proceed. Once the communications simulator
reaches t2, it stops executing and hands over the control to the co-simulator scheduler.
Figure 21: Co-simulation synchronization interrupts (R: read, W: write, C: control applica-
tion).
The co-simulator scheduler executes 8 cycles from the power simulator until t1, at which
point it passes the inputs from the power network to the control application of IED1. An-
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other 3 cycles of the power simulation are executed until the power simulator reaches simu-
lation time t2. Next, the co-simulation scheduler informs IED2 to check its network input
queue. It then calculates the packet processing duration required by IED2. This transmis-
sion duration depends on the number of received packets, confidentiality and authentication
protocols employed, and processing power of the device.
Algorithm 1 Co-simulation scheduler algorithm.
1: Set next mtsync for t = 0
2: if mt is a received message addressed to IED at time t then
3: Put mt into the appropriate IED network input queue
4: else if mt is a mtsync message then
5: tsync ← t
6: for ∀x ∈ A do
7: k ← currentState(x)
8: while endT(s(x,k)) ≤ t do





14: if writes(s(x,k)) ∧ endT(s(x,k)) ≤ tsync then
15: tsync ← endT(s(x,k))
16: else if reads(s(x,k)) ∧ startT(s(x,k)) ≤ tsync then





22: Set next mtsync for tsync
23: Go to line 2.
24: end if
Once the co-simulation scheduler knows the current time states of all network devices, it
schedules the next synchronization point tsync. In the discussed example, that point equals
to t5, the time when IED1 finishes its network write state. Once again, the communications
simulator executes until tsync, and hands over the execution to the co-simulator, which in
turn executes the IEDs and power network. Due to the fact that IED1 has a much shorter
execution cycle, multiple packets can be sent before IED2 receives any.
In real-time control networks, this is done to achieve the required transmission reliabil-
ity, since a retransmission of a given packet is not allowed to avoid transmitting outdated
information. In the example, the first time IED2 sends a packet via the communications
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network is at simulation time t11, and the first time the IED2 receives a packet from IED1
is at simulation time t12. Since synchronization is done at the end of the writing process and
at the beginning of reading operation, only one tsync is required at t11. The co-simulation
scheduler algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1.
5.5 CO-SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the co-simulation results in regards to the synchronization error
between both OMNeT++ and MATLAB simulators. By minimizing the synchronization
delay errors, we show that it is possible to simulate a more realistic representation of the
real-world microgrid system effectively.
The primary controller at each motor provides torque and rotor speed measurements to
the secondary controller at a regular interval. The secondary controller collects the measured
data and then calculates the appropriate duty cycles for each of the two DC/DC converters
to alter the power flow to the machine loads.
The latency between the measured torque and motor speed, and the adjustment of the
power supplied by the DC/DC converters constitutes the primary and secondary control com-
munications loop delay (Fig. 22). Note that the primary controllers and the two DC/DC
converters execute in parallel. However, the secondary controllers have to process the incom-
ing data from the primary controllers before operating with an additional delay of Npri · tr
(where Npri is the number of primary controllers and tr is the multicast packet depacketiza-
tion delay).
Additionally, we have tpri = 0.08, tsec = 0.5, and tconv = 0.08, which correspond to
the primary controller, secondary controller, and DC/DC converter application cycle time,
respectively. For each multicast message there is a packetization delay defined as ts. In
the simulation scenarios, we assume 100 Mbps link capacity and a microgrid architecture
consisting of three primary controllers, one secondary controller, two DC/DC converters.
Further, the maximum multicast packet size corresponds to 336 bits. For more details on
the configuration, please refer to [11]. Please note, that the theoretical analysis ignores any
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intermediate communication devices processing delays. The controller loop latency Tcntrl−loop
corresponds to 660 ms, and is appropriated as following
Tcntrl−loop = tpri + tsec + tconv + 2 · ts + 2 · td + (Npri + 1) · tr, (5.1)
For the simulation evaluation, the OMNeT++ network environment is consistent with
the theoretical analysis - 100 Mbps links, application data on top of IP/UDP, multicast
communication for all data, and all the distributed controllers are connected to a single
router. The control loop delay is measured for every control cycle; i.e. every duty cycle
command sent by the secondary controller to the two DC/DC converters. Table 12 presents
the measured control loop delays corresponding to the different co-simulation synchronization
methods.
Figure 22: Primary-secondary controller distributed control loop.
For each synchronization option, we executed ten times a five second microgrid cold-
start scenario - the procedure of starting all induction machines from an off state. At the
beginning, each of the induction machine starts at 1 second interval and creates harmonics on
the microgrid DC power exchange bus. After receiving torque and rotor speed values from the
primary controllers, the secondary controller sends duty cycle commands to the two DC/DC
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converters in order to compensate for the disturbance and stabilize the power bus voltage
levels. In addition, each IED has a random boot-up delay between 5 and 10ms in order to
represent a realistic environment in which the controllers are not fully synchronized. This is
the reason for the standard deviation of the control loop delay between the scenario re-runs
(σcntrl−loop). When using the dynamic synchronization approach, the mean control loop delay
(Dcntrl−loop) is the same as when using a fixed step of 0.0005s. The 5µs step corresponds
to the fixed step of the MATLABâĂŹs simulation of the power network. However, while
using ∆T consistent with MATLAB may not introduce an additional delay in the control
loop (row two of Table 12) the mean execution time for each scenario is significantly higher
372 seconds (using 2.7 GHz i7 with 16 GB RAM). In terms of execution speed, selecting one
seconds synchronization step results in the fastest scenario run; however this setting results
in 1145ms mean control loop delay, thus leading to severe performance degradation of the
power control operations. Finally, the mean synchronization error (Esync) is on close to half
∆T , meaning that packets arriving at the destination controller, have to wait on average
half a synchronization step before being passed to the controllerâĂŹs application.
Table 9: Co-simulation results: Comparison of the proposed dynamic co-simulation scheduler









Dynamic 666.8 0 49.9 76
0.00005 666.8 0.000025 45 372
0.001 695 0.0006 53.1 86
0.01 745 0.009 42.4 80
0.1 738 0.09 5.6 75
1 1145 0.87 39.3 68
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5.6 CONCLUSIONS
To accurately capture the overall operation of the discussed microgrid, we proposed a co-
simulation model driven by embedded power controllers. Further, we proposed a novel
co-simulation scheduler taking into account events from both the power and communication
network simulators, as well as the timing of each embedded controller execution loop to
adaptively synchronize both simulators efficiently. The proposed approach ensures minimal
synchronization error while still providing the ability to simulate extended operational sce-
narios. The numerical results illustrate that the proposed dynamic synchronization scheduler
outperforms the considered conventional time-stepped synchronization mechanism in terms
of synchronization error, while significantly decreasing the computation complexity in terms
of simulation duration.
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6.0 EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATIONS DELAY ON DISTRIBUTED
MICROGRID CONTROL
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Abetter understanding of onshore wind behavior has been the attention of many engineers in
the last several years. The Department of Energy (DOE), through FOA-414, has found great
interest in exploring the integration of offshore wind and has funded a team of organizations
to explore the wind speed behaviors at sea and determine the optimal location for placing
large wind turbines on the coasts of the United States. Not only is optimal wind turbine
placement important, but investigating ways of integrating the power into the grid are being
considered [103]. Drilling rigs and offshore oil platforms rely heavily on AC variable frequency
drives (VFD) for applications such as propulsion, station keeping, drilling, and pumping
product to the surface. In drilling rigs, drill-ships, and offshore production platforms, the
non-linear variable speed drive load makes up 85% of the installed kW. The typical installed
drive power for a drilling package is 5,000-12,000 HP (3.7 to 9 MW) [104]. Drilling rigs and oil
platforms are placing considerable harmonic strain on generators and degrading the quality
of the voltage supplies. As stated in [104], the power quality is degraded due to harmonic
currents produced during the conversion from AC to DC for variable frequency drives. Today
domestic offshore oil drilling takes place in the Gulf of Mexico and Northern Alaska, as shown
in Fig. 23. The eastern seaboards, from North Carolina through Maine, are locations with
the greatest potential for offshore oil and gas drilling. Early results from the FOA-414
DOE study are shown in Fig. 24. Comparing Fig. 1 with Fig. 2, one will note a strong
overlap between high wind penetration and oil drilling areas approved by the United States
government. The medium voltage DC architecture [5] has often been referred to as a type of
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microgrid upon first view. The microgrid concept was first proposed in 2002 as a better way
to implement the emerging potential of distributed generation. During disturbances, the
generation and corresponding loads can separate from the disturbed grid, maintain service,
and not harm the overall gridâĂŹs integrity [105]. As pointed out by [106], the difficult task
is to achieve the microgrid functionality without extensive custom engineering and still have
high system reliability and generation placement flexibility.
Figure 23: Oil drilling opportunities between 2012 and 2017 [5].
The fundamental microgrid requirements include the capability of operating in islanding
and/or on-grid modes with high stability, mode switching with minimum load disruption and
shedding during transitions, and after a transition, stabilize in a certain amount of time. The
high-level technical challenges associated with microgrids include (1) operation modes and
transitions that comply with IEEE 1547 (Standard for Interconnecting Distributed Resources
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Figure 24: Planned location of offshore wind turbines [6].
with Electric Power Systems) and (2) control architecture and communication. For the case
of an AC based microgrid, the following items are considered by various research teams:
Islanding mode: frequency and voltage stability, optimal power flow;
• Grid to islanding mode: transition and stabilization, minimum load shedding and dis-
ruption;
• Islanding to grid mode: re-synchronization and re-connection, minimum impact on sen-
sitive loads and electronics as transients evolve during state transitions.
Coupling offshore renewable energy expansion, variable frequency drive based platforms,
and the microgrid theme, a proposed system architecture is provided in Fig. 25 utilizing
a DC backbone. The directions that many manufacturers of power system equipment are
exploring with offshore technologies to harness and transmit electric power provide further
encouragement that the proposed research efforts/system architecture is viable [107].
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Figure 25: Local offshore wind power supplying power to offshore production platform [5].
6.1.1 Challenges to the Communication Network
Microgrids require fast, secure, and reliable communication means to operate and coexist.
Under normal operations, the communications allows microgrids to synchronize with the
main grid prior to connecting, thus extending equipment lifetime and minimizing transient
periods in the electrical network. In emergencies, signaling would ensure that the power
exchange would be disengaged prior to power equipment’s detection of abnormal levels of
voltage or frequency, thereby avoiding any potential damage.
In order to achieve these goals, the three main requirements of the communication system
are: (i) real-time performance guarantees, evaluated via worst case delay performance anal-
ysis, (ii) security, providing tempering and confidentiality guarantees while respecting the
real-time boundaries, and (iii) extremely high availability, needed to ensure non-interrupted
services. All of those requirements are challenging due to the mere fact that both power
and communication subsystems are electrical networks. The first, the power, is an analog
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electrical system, while the second, the communication, is a digital electrical system. Even in
the presence of optical fibre communication links, most of the delays in the communication
network would be introduced by the embedded control sub-systems that govern the flow of
control messages and the execution of control logic. These systems are digital electrical ma-
chines that have interfaces to both the power and communication networks. On a per cycle
manner, the devices query the power network sensors, execute control logic, and, if required,
take appropriate corrective actions. At the end of a given cycle, each device sends packets
via the communication network that carries periodic data and control notifications. There-
fore, it is of importance for the node receiver that the message arrives prior to the power
network state modification. Since both networks consist of electrical devices, the challenge
to the communication network could be viewed as electricity chasing electricity. The time
unit of the packetized control signals traveling within the communication network is on the
order of milliseconds (msecs) [7]. Also, some of the control and measurement messages are
broadcasted or multicasted in nature, resulting in the generation of multiple packets for a
single event notification. However, an electrical phenomenon in the power network lasts
under tens of msecs. End-to-end packet delay can be close to the upper boundary of the
power transient.
Fig. 26 summarizes the different time-scales in the power and communication networks.
The time unit of the packetized control signals traveling within the communication network
is on the order of msecs.
In this article, we present the control algorithm design for stable microgrid power oper-
ations. In addition, we present the distribute system architecture and the communications
network that is designed to facilitate the secure message exchange. Finally, we present co-
simulation effect and qualify the effect of communication and sub-system delay onto the
microgrid’s power network stability.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides an overview of related work in
the fields of power control algorithms and microgrid communication studies. Section III
presents the mathematical framework for the design of the controllers. Section IV builds
onto the mathematical foundation and presents the distributed system architecture. The
co-simulation validation tool and simulation results are presented in Section V. Finally, we
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draw our conclusions in Section VI.
Figure 26: Power vs. Telecommunication subsystems timescale [7].
6.2 RELATED WORK
In commercial or residential buildings, the use of DC distribution architectures is proposed
in literature to increase efficiency by allowing the use of larger and more efficient centralized
distribution rectification stages rather than individual point-of-load rectifiers for the loads
requiring DC [108–110]. Other proposed applications for DC architectures are for microgrid
applications to more efficiently integrate energy storage and distributed renewable generation
that produce DC voltage, such as in suggested cellular communication microgrids [111,112].
However, most of the research conducted so far has concentrated on AC microgrid design
[113]. The DC microgrid has a similar network structure compared to a single phase AC
microgrid. The fundamental differences include the existence of a frequency component and
reactive power flow control is not necessary in a DC system. Power flow is controlled by
voltage droops in AC [114–117] and DC systems [118].
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Only a few works conceived the microgrid as a whole problem taking into account the
different control levels. In the literature, [119] and [120] provide exceptional overviews of
the three control layers within microgrids - primary control, secondary control, and tertiary
control. The primary control - droop control discussed earlier - is often used to emulate
physical behaviors to make the system stable and more damped. The primary control main-
tains voltage and frequency stability of the microgrid prior to islanding. The secondary
control ensures that the electrical signals through the microgrid are within the required val-
ues compensating voltage and frequency deviations toward zero when necessary caused by
the operation of the primary controls. Finally, the tertiary layer controls the power flow
between the microgrid and main grid. Currently there is little microgrid specific communi-
cations research [121] outside of [122]. This is especially true for industrial size microgrids
such as studied here. In [122] a survey of microgrid protocols, architectures, equipment
and security threats is given. The authors propose an architecture defining interfaces and
points for cyber-security mechanisms by grouping microgrid equipment into enclaves based
on their functionality. They note the crucial need to secure the microgrid control system
communications. However, the real-time nature of the communications, the resource limita-
tions of intelligent electrical devices (IEDs) and the distributed hierarchical nature of the
microgrid control systems are not addressed. An in-depth analysis of microgrid distributed
controllers and options for the communications network are presented in [123]. As far as the
communication network is concerned, the authors’ main focus is on the bandwidth of the
communication link and the size of message packets. Here, we note that the IEDs are the
bottleneck of the electrical and communications co-system and as such we analyze the limits
end-device computation at the expense of communication overhead.
6.3 MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK OF POWER SYSTEM
ARCHITECTURE
The simplified power system architecture under investigation for this study is found in Fig.
27. The model is composed of one, 5MW wind turbine system (permanent magnet syn-
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chronous generator and rectifier), two bidirectional DC/DC converters, and motor drive
units rated for 1.67 MW each. The purpose of this section is to provide the mathemati-
cal framework of all the electrical models and control structures associated with the power
converters and electric machines.
Figure 27: System architecture for power and communication evaluation.
6.3.0.1 Wind Turbine Modeling The wind collection system that was modeled within
the Matlab/Simulink environment is composed of 1 wind turbine which will be represented by
an aerodynamic model, permanent magnet synchronous generator (PMSG), and a three-level
neutral point clamped rectifier that generates the required DC bus voltage. The parameters
associated with the machine and wind turbine characteristics are provided in [124]. A stan-
dard set of electrical equations, with respect to the dq rotor reference frame, describing the
permanent magnet synchronous machine are listed as (1) with output torque listed as (2).
Note that Ls is the stator leakage inductance, Îżm is the permanent magnet flux of constant
magnitude, ÏĽ is the rotor speed, P is the number of pole pairs, F is a friction factor, and
J the moment of inertia of the machine [125]. The machine model described by (1) and (2)
assumes that saturation is neglected, induced emfâĂŹs are sinusoidal, the Eddy currents
and hysteresis losses are negligible, and there are no field current dynamics. Finally, the
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mechanical equation, based on NewtonâĂŹs second law, of the machine is listed as (3).




Vq = Rsiq + Ls
diq
dt






(λmiq + (Lds − Lqs)siq) (2)
Te − Tm − Fωr = J dωr
dt
(3)
According to [126], the optimal torque reference can be obtained using (4) through (6).
Note that Îżopt is the optimal tip speed ratio, Cp is the constant power coefficient, A is the











Cp,max = Cp(β|β=0, λopt) (6)
Three-phase power systems are conveniently modeled and controlled in the dq coordinate
system. For maximum torque control applications, itâĂŹs always desired to drive the d-
axis current to zero and maximize the q-axis current capability as indicated in (2). Hence
establishing the q-axis current reference based on the maximum torque determined with (4)
to (6) is logical for extracting maximum power. The wind turbine controller is shown in Fig.
28.
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Figure 28: Maximum Power Point Tracking Implementation and Control of Wind Turbine.
6.3.0.2 Wind Turbine Modeling The half-bridge converter is a basic building block
for the multilevel neutral point clamped converter. The neutral point clamped converter is
utilized to interface the wind turbine to the medium voltage DC bus bar. The average model
of the half-bridge converter is adequately discussed in [127]. Using the terminal voltage of
the converter described by (7) and noting the power balance relationship written as (8) that
relates the AC and DC sides, Fig. 29 provides the average circuit model of the neutral point
clamped converter. The modulation index, shown in red, is dynamic whose value is adjusted
by the control system.




idcVdc = vtaia + vtbib + vtcic (8)
6.3.0.3 Grid Connected Average Rectifier Model The average model of the pulse
width modulated rectifier can be shown to be (9) and (10) with definitions listed as (11). For
further reading on the subject, consider [128]. The approach to regulate real and reactive
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Figure 29: Average Model of Neutral Point Clamped Converter.
power through the power converter is provided in Fig.30. This converter serves as the main






































6.3.0.4 Grid Connected Average Rectifier Model The dual active bridge DC/DC
converter was first proposed in [129]. The converter topology has grown in popularity as
demand in bidirectional power flow capability has increased in research pursuits such as
battery charger applications for electric vehicles. Research teams have devised new control
techniques for improving system efficiencies [130] and using state of the art semiconductor
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Figure 30: Open Loop PQ Regulator of Pulse Width Modulated Boost Rectifier.
devices for high frequency operation of the topology [131]. Research efforts have been pri-
marily centered upon low power applications. In this work, we utilize the dual active bridge
as an interface between two medium voltage (kV) DC busses. The most notable characteris-
tic is the phase delay, ÏŢ, between both full bridges, which controls the allowable power flow











where VDC is the input voltage, LT the transformer leakage inductor, and n the turns
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Figure 31: Average model of bidirectional DC/DC converter.
ratio of the high frequency transformer [29]. The DC/DC converter average model is imple-
mented into the computer as shown in [[TO DO]]Fig. 9.
6.3.0.5 Variable Frequency Drive Model The dynamic relationships that govern the
current controller for the variable frequency motor drive on the offshore platform are listed
as (14) and (15). The details of their derivation can be found in [127]. Note that Vsd and
Vsq are the direct and quadrature voltages, imr is the magnetization current, ÏĽ is machine
speed, isq and isd are the direct and quadrature currents, ÏČ and ÏĎs are machine variables
defined by (16) through (18). Note that Ls, Lr, and Lm are the stator, rotor, and magnetizing
inductance, respectively. All variables are referred to the stator of the machine.
Vsq = Rs
[






− 1, σr = Lr
Lm
− 1 (16)
σs = 1− 1







Motor drive parameters and controller are provided in Table I and Fig. 11, respectively.
One important feature of Fig. 32 is the established isd.
Table 10: Induction Motor Drive Machine Parameters.
Parameter Numerical
Quantity
Nominal Power, P 1.678 MW
Pole Pairs 12
Nominal Voltage, VLL 2300V
Nominal Frequency, ωo 377 rad/s
Stator Resistance, Rs 29 mΩ
Rotor Resistance, Rr 29 mΩ
Magnetizing Inductance, Lm 34.6 mH
Stator Inductance, Ls 35.2 mH
Rotor Inductance, Lr 35.2 mH
Stator Leakage Factor, σs 0.0173
Stator Leakage Factor, σs 0.0173
Total Leakage Factor, σ 0.0337
Stator Time Constant, τs 1.213 secs
Rotor Time Constant, τr 1.6 secs
Controller Constant, τ 3 ms
Controller Gains, KP , KI 13.67,333 sec−1
imr Controller Gains 79.6, 50 sec−1
90
Figure 32: Average model of bidirectional DC/DC converter.
6.4 DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
During cycling to cycle operation, each type of embedded controller, the primary, the sec-
ondary, and the DC/DC converter, experience fixed and variable tasks. Each of that opera-
tion require computation resources, e.g. control logic calculation, for instance, that introduce
delay within the distributed control loop. In the fallowing subsections, we discuss each delay
in detail.
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Figure 33: Microgrid’s distributed communication architecture.
6.4.1 Power Control Loop
As to evaluate the real-time performance of the power control system, here we define the
distributed control loop. The loop includes the hierarchical 3-level distributed controllers.
At the lowest level is the independent open-loop primary controller. At the end of every
cycle, the primary controller sends measured torques and speed of the attached induction
machine. One level higher, the secondary controller receives the measured torques and speed
values from all primary controllers located in the microgrid. In addition to the primary con-
troller measurements, the secondary controller receives voltage level samples from the two
DC/DC converters. Similarly to the primary controllers, the DC/DC converters send the
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Figure 34: Microgrid’s distributed control-loop.
measurements at the end of each execution cycle. Given all measured values in the microgrid,
at the end of its cycle the secondary controller send adjusted duty cycle commands to the
DC/DC converters. As the last step, the two DC/DC converters apply their respective com-
manded duty cycles. Graphical representation of the distributed control loop delay is shown
by Fig. 34. At the highest control level, the Tertiary controller is in charge of facilitation
conversation between the local microgrid and outside power networks. Those could be the
main "stiff" grid, power generating facilities such as windfarm or other microgrids. Outside
microgrid operations that involve the Tertiary controller, such as the transition from island
to grid modes and vice versa, are outside of the scope of this paper. Fig. 33 presents the
distributed communication architecture.
6.4.2 System Delays
Here we define formal the end-to-end delay Tcntrl−loop, as the time a sample is read until an
adjustments is applied, of the distributed control loop
Tcntrl−loop = tpri + tsec + tconv + 2ts + 2td + (Npri + 1)tr (18)
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6.4.2.1 Control Logic Execution Delay In order to execute the control logic, each
embedded controller’s application needs a fixed amount of execution time. The embedded
application would run on top of Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) which will have a fixed
time slot for the execution of the application. Table 11 presents the assumed application
execution time-slots for each of the embedded controller, that are consistent with [120]. The
control logic delay in each microgrid controller is assumed to be deterministic.




Number of primary controllers, Npri 3
Primary controller cycle duration, tpri 0.08 sec
Secondary controller cycle duration, tsec 0.5 sec
DC/DC converter cycle duration, tconv 0.08 sec
Transmission & Propagation per link delay, td 0.00005
sec
Packetization (inc. encryption) delay, ts 0.24 sec
Depacketization (inc. decryption) delay, tr 0.16 sec
Size of message payload (IP/UDP) 42 bytes
6.4.2.2 Security delay In our previous work [132], we presented a multicast security
protocol that complies with the 3ms end-to-end delay posed by IEC 61850 [133]. The protocol
leverages symmetric AES encryption confidentiality within the microgrid, and AES-based
CMAC-96 message signatures for authentication. The targeted microgrid network [[Figure
Ref]] consists of around 50 IEDs. At worst case, assuming that each secure multicast message
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would need to be verified by each device within the network, the overhead due to the security
protocol in terms of delay and packet size is given in Table 11.
6.4.2.3 Transmission and Propagation Delay Prior to the beginning and after the
end of each application cycle the RTOS would receive, depackatize, and transmit, or packa-
tize, communication packets. The microgrid employs the Ethernet/UDP/IP protocols. We
define the packatization and depackatization delay at the sending and received end, that is
expired by each packet to be the transmission delay. Furthermore, we assume conventional
100Mbps links to be employed within the communication network. The time between the
last bit of a packet to be send and the first bit of the packet to be received by the other side
is defined as propagation delay. All message within the microgrid are assumed to be of two
types - sampled values and control messages. The message size is fixed at 42 bytes [134].
One link transmission and propagation delay is listed in Table 11. In addition to the fixed
packets size, there is variable security overhead discussed in the previous section.
6.4.3 Communication Reliability
Due to the real-time delivery requirements, in order to minimize end-to-end delay the trans-
mission protocol employed is UDP. Another reason for not employing TCP is the fact that
by the time re-transmission arrive at the destination the data contained is stale. Since UDP
does not provide re-transmission, reliability is achieved via periodic transmission of the most
current measured values. In addition, the secondary controller cycle duration is about six
times longer, than the duration of the primary controller or DC/DC converter. As such,




In order to evaluate the performance of the power control algorithms in realistic setting, we
developed co-simulation tool. The tool incorporated the microgrids power and communica-
tion network via adaptive simulation co-scheduler [135]. The power network was simulated
via Matlab, the communication network employed OMNeT++ , and the scheduler used the
Adevs framework . The co-simulator was primary build as to investigate the performance of
the power control algorithms in a realistic environments. In addition the tool, let us observe
the adverse effect of delay onto the power control. Furthermore, we were able to compare
different security architectures and their stability to be used in real-time multicast protocol
for use in power networks’ communications. From the investigation, we were able to quantify
the effect of the types of delays.
The initial set-up was used as a baseline against the standalone Matlab simulations of
the microgrid’s power network. The communication network was bypassed, and the separate
distributed controllers were directly exchanging cycle-by-cycle inputs and outputs. The only
delay presents in the system was 0.005ms Matlab’s internal fix-step. In those ideal conditions,
the power output levels stabilized after transient periods, e.g. the star-ups of each induction
machine. In the test scenario 3 induction machines started at over a second intervals (Fig.
35). For instance, at the first induction machine starts 1 seconds after the start of the
scenario. The distributed controller can stabilize the output power prior to the start-up of
the second induction machine at 1.7 seconds. The final induction machine starts and has no




Figure 35: Stability of Microgrid’d output power under different delay constraints.
6.5.1 Effect of Communication Network Delay
For next step, the communication network was introduced in the loop. The initial test
involved only transmission and transportation delay. The communication network makes
use of the UDP/IP/Ethernet protocols. Since the output data rates of each embedded
controller is low (10-100kbps) compared to the link bandwidths (.1-10Gbps), we assume that
the communication network is congestion free. Furthermore, since the microgrid network
is private dedicated industrial control network, there is no other traffic than the control
messages exchanged and therefore there is no background traffic.
During the simulation, the data packets transmitted did not have any security measure-
ments and were all of unicast nature. The presentation of those results is omitted from
Fig. 35, due to the fact each link hop introduced marginal 0.05ms delay. The power control
algorithm was more than capable of correction of the transmission and transportation delay.
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6.5.2 Effect of Security Protocol Delay
In out previous work [132] we proposed a real-time secure multicast aimed at smart grid
operational technology data exchanges. Here we present the simulations result when the
security measures were introduced within the microgrids control loop. The zoomed window
in Fig. 35 shows a closeup of the two power output waveforms. The direct connection (light
blue), with no communication network present, is used a baseline to compare to the full
communication delay (magenta). The communication delay graph includes transmission,
transportation and secure protocol packetization and depacketization delay at each end-
device. Furthermore, when employing security measures, the data packets have addition
bits of overhead. However, the transportation delay for the additional data is negligible
compared to the encryption and decryption delays. Table 12) presents measured results
from the simulation scenario. The scenario was ran 10 different time with different random
start-up delay for each embedded controller. The start-up delay is normally distributed 0.01-
0.005 seconds. In the presence of communication delay, the mean control loop delay is 0.74
sec. This introduced a mean output error of 0.00057 MW. This is the difference between the
two waveforms obsessed on the zoom region in figure 35.








No System Delay 0.005 - -
Comm. Delay Only 0.66 0.00057 0.000186
Full System Delay unstable 666.8 -5.74 0.026
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6.5.3 Effect of Operating System Delay
As discussed prior, each embedded controller will have internal delay associated with the
execution of the control logic, as well as miscellaneous tasks (reading or writing to outputs,
etc.). We assume that primary controller and DC/DC Converters have 80ms internal delays,
and the secondary controller has 500ms delay [120]. When such delay was introduced within
the distributed control loop, the system becomes unstable. The power output levels of the
microgrid while considering all system delay is the presented as well in Fig. 35. The presence
of such large control loop delay, 666.8ms on average is too significant to maintain a stability
power levels within the microgrid.
6.6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented a microgrid power control architecture and the supporting com-
munications infrastructure. In addition, a mathematical framework was provided as to justify
the design of the distributed control approach. Simulation results were presented and dis-
cussed, as well as the future direction for research. A novel design of microgrid control is
needed in order to cope with the significant delays introduced by the embedded controller.
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7.0 CLOSING REMARKS
This dissertation presents an overview of the emerging trends in the power network and
the challenges posed to the supporting communication network. Chapters II-V present an
overview of microgrid communication networks, the design of secure real-time communication
protocols, and the simulation framework created to validate those protocols. In chapter VI,
the effect of system delay on power control algorithms and their ability to maintain stable
voltage output level is presented.
7.1 LIMITATIONS OF THIS WORK
There are a number of assumption and omissions from this work. For the purpose of clarity,
those limitations are listed in this section.
Data Characteristics. The profile of the microgrid’s data considered in this work is
the real-time control messages used for synchronization of the hierarchical distributed con-
trollers. Non-vital data used for maintenance and logging functions, such as NERC CIP
historian requirements [136], are not explicitly addressed. The overall goal of this disserta-
tion is the design of the telecommunication network by aiming to address the most stringent
requirements - the end-to-end real-time data transportation requirements. The underlying
assumption is that a network designed for real-time data transfer and reliability should be
robust enough to handle the non-real-time data flow. However, this approach relies on the
premise that the data links are underutilized, which may not be the case in the presence
of non-vital data flow. Any further investigation should consider maintenance data traffic’s
effect on the control data flow. Furthermore, throughout this work the IEC 61850 and IEC
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62351 protocols are used to derive baseline requirements for the microgrid’s communications
network. It is the authors opinions that those are the two substation automation commu-
nication protocols with the most demanding communication requirements. The solutions
presented in this work are designed with generosity in mind. As such any designs are trans-
ferable to networks making use of other application layer SAS protocols, such as DNP 2/3
or Modbus [137].
Communication Network. The data links employed within the microgrid are assumed
to be UDP over IP over Ethernet or fiber-optic cables. The main consideration in the
evaluation is the transmission speed of each link. Those are assumed to be 100Mbps. Due to
the real-time end-to-end delay requirements of all control data, TCP over IP communication
is considered unsuited for the application [138]. The re-transmission and sequence (re-
)ordering functionalities of TCP are not desired. Each control data packet is self-contained,
and the data carried does not depend on prior or post frames. The packet with the freshest
timestamp makes all prior timestamped packets obsolete (even if received out of order).
Cyber-security. Most notably this work omits an in-depth discussion on cyber-security
key distribution, storage, and renewal. These authors feel that this topic is significant enough
to be addressed on it own merit. A key distribution analysis should consider the events of
devices quasi-dynamically leaving and joining the microgrid network. The current assump-
tion is that the network communication participants are static. The solution uses a single
key to ensure confidentiality within the microgrid. However, integrity and authentication is
ensured via point-to-point keys between a sender-receiver pair. Admittedly, this solution is
less scalable than multicast group solutions [139]. However, the authors feel that the extra
cost is justified since a compromise of a single note does not jeopardize the authentication
security of the entire microgrid. Finally, the proposed security protocol does not comply
with NERC-CIP’s requirements for substation automation communication networks. Most
notably, the devices within the Microgrid network are IP addressable, which is not the case
in NERC-CIP specification [140].
Real-time operating system (RTOS). The investigation in this work assumes the
use of RTOS as operating systems on the microgrid IEDs. This assumption is inline with
best case practices employed by the utility equipment manufacturers. Most notably, this
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techniques is used to ensure real-time guarantees on the execution of high-priory systems
tasks [141].
7.2 FUTURE DIRECTION
As discussed earlier in this work, the results show that power control algorithms are very
sensitive to delay within the control loop.ÂăA possible future research direction would be an
investigation into more robust distributed algorithms. One approach would be to push more
of the control logic onto the edge open-loop independent controllers - mainly the primary
controllers and DC/DC Converters. This would result in removing the relatively slow sec-
ondary controller from the cycle-to-cycle operations loop, and changing its role to a profile
setting function.Âă âĂĺAn important question to address is how microgrids fit into today’s
power distribution network. A natural comparison to the microgrid’s communication net-
work is the substation communication network. The communication protocols employed in
those networks, e.g., IEC 61850, DNP3, do not provide cyber-security and instead rely on
perimeter security - firewalls and private networks. Therefore, an important investigation
would be to evaluate the suitability of the secure real-time protocol discussed in Chapter
IV to substation communication. Such investigation would require greater substation in-
vestment in a simulation tool, mainly in order to assess the ability to simulate a network
of hundreds or even thousands of real-time embedded devices. Investigation of this area
would require paralyzation of the simulation and the simultaneous execution of simulator
sub-parts on networked cluster machines. The foundation for paralyzation of the simula-
tion is presented in Chapter V, and describes a co-simulation scheduler that treats devices
as independent entities until a future synchronization point.Âă âĂĺ On microgrid specific
topics, this dissertation omits any discussion of intra-microgrid communications as in these
cases, the tertiary controller would be involved in setting-up, tearing-down and facilitating
message sessions between two or more microgrids. As is shown in this current investigation,
a slow responsive device, such as the secondary controller, has an adverse effect on the sta-
bility of power voltage levels. With the introduction of the even slower responding tertiary
102
controller, the power control strategy is bound to become more complex and challenging.
From a communications standpoint, there would then be a need for the investigation of how
the microgrid would conduct an initial handshake. Having a third party certificate authority
may pose a security risk and increase the overall system delay.Âă
Another opportunity for extension of this work is investigating real-time secure com-
munication at billion devices scale. Notoriously, such protocols do not scale well beyond
a few hundred devices. The current trends in Information Technology, such as Internet of
Things (IoT) and Cloud Computing, are focusing on secure, persistent connectivity. How-
ever, the current generation of vendor solutions provide less than real-time communication
performance as far as the power network is concerned. A round trip time of the hundred mil-
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